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],OREWORD

Of the vast mosaic of alliaaces. seoret
treaties and eoonomio rivalry that preoeded the World
War. historioal reaearch has widely negleoted that
section involving the negotiations of Germa.ny and
England on

t~e

possibility of the ultimate partition

of the Portuguese colonie8 between themselves.

Thes.

negotiatlons cover much of that period before the
flrst World War durlng whioh the ulianoe systems were
con8ummated.

Examination of these negotiations gives

some imsight into the labyrinthine tunnels of seoret
treaties. alliances. and oounter-uliances.

SUch an

examina tion not only shows how such stupld diplomaoy
works but also serves as an exoellent reflector bJ
whioh one oan see how imperialism and balanoe of power
beoame motivations for the various alignments that did
so muoh to make modern hiStory what it is.

Hence tit

oan be said that the Portuguese negotiations offer an
interesting study not only for their inherent historical value but also for the illumination they obliquely
cast on the genesis of the disastrous allianoe system
and its natural result--the World War.
The negotiations themselves that occurred

i~

_______________________________________

~

vi
between Germ&n7 end England beoause of the colonies
of England's age-old ally, Portugal, fall into two
main divisions.

The first division embrace. an in-

trioate series of diplomatic maneuvers just prior to
the Boer War. a series of maneuvers that had

COD-

siderable importance in determining the complexion of
that war.

The second series involving the Portuguese

colonies occurred approximately two years prior to
the World War.

The seoond development was in reality

an outgrowth of the fir st, which had become dormant
after Eng1s.nd refused to make an iDl1DBdiate division
of Portuguese oolonies possible.

The seoond period

of negotiation was begun more as a means of finding
some grounds on which to establish the beginning of a
better understanding between mntually hostile Germany
and England than simply as a means of increasing the
oolonial domains af the respective negotiators.
The episode has a rather sordid oharacter
beoause Portugal, a sovereign state, was not offioially consulted during the negotiations. nor waa
Portugal informed of the oomplete oontents of the
treaties that resulted from these negotiations.
Although more or less forced by the pressure of
events and German diplomaoy to work with Germany at
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this ante-mortem dissection of the Portuguese Empire,
England's participation was particularly embarrassing
to her.

It was embarrassing beoause England and

Portugal had been oonstant allies for over half a
millemum.

The manner in whioh England resolved the

dilemma of keeping an old friend (Portugal) at the
S8me

time she was supposedly paying tribute with her

friend's possessions to a possible enemy (GermaD7)
fully cognizant of hi. potentiality provides an
interesting problem of research.
In order to show the salient features of the
problem, this paper will endeavor to aooomplish the
following: (1) give a oomprehensive background of
Anglo-portuguese relations from the inoeption of the
old friendship between those two oountries to the end
of the Nineteenth Century, (2) give a background of
the international situation that diotated England'.
diplomatio negotiating with Germany for the possible
disposal of Portuguese possessioDS, (3) give an
account of the negotiat1ons, (4) analJze the motivations, (5) analyze the outcome, and (6) attempt to
show the i.mpossib11ity of secret alliances based on
selfish fears.
Al though a oonscientious effort was made for

r -

I

it, ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

r

i

Till
acouracy and objeotivity in this research, some
hypothecation was neoessary to explain why England
agreed to discuss the possib1lity of dividing her
friend's empire and to explain why the agreement.
relative to the division ot the empire never
materialized.

If the writer appears to tend some-

what toward partiaJ.ity and conjecture. he begs that
the color ot events in the international soene at
the time of this writing be accepted a8

So

partial

exou.e.
After the first reference to the British
Doo'WDenta !!

.!!! Origin .!1 the War and,Di. Grosse

Politik !!! Europaisohen Kabinette ta this thesis
they w111 be respectively referred to as B. D. and
G. P.

No specific maps illustrating the territorial
distribution .et forth by the treaties were available for the writing of this thesis.

The data on

the maps appearing in this thesis were assimilated
from the text of the treaties themselves.

The infor-

mat10n was verif1ed as well as possible by comparison
with general maps of Afrioa.

Good cop1es of suoh

map. appear in the following atlases:

Hammgnd's New World Atly!' Doubleday Doran,
!nc., Garden Clt7, New ork, 1939
The Matthews-Northr;; New International
oii7 Inc., !ew York

Itta., Blue RIbbon

Any gene;al atlas could be used, however, for verifi-

cation.

CHAPTER I

THE "ANCIENT" PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH ALLIANCE

OIUPfEB I
THE "ANCIENT" PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH ALLIANCEl

"England does not make alliances-she grants them."
--Lord Cranborne. eon of Lord Salisbury
Near the close of the Middle .&g.s--IS'l1 to
be preci •• --a treaty was concluded between England'.

House of Lancaster and Portugal's House of Avis. 2
This treaty was to be the predeoessor of a vast and
uninterrupted series of treaties binding these two
-

kingdoms into an alliance that became by far the
oldest existing alliance of the world. 3 In faot. if
one were to be exact. the seeds of this understanding
that is eo deeply rooted .in modern history were alreadl
sown during the Crusades, when the English and Portuguese established the friendship that was to grow into
this most permanent of all allianoes. 4 With but few

1. The word "Anoient" Is used here despite the
fact that the treaties were conoluded in medieval
rather than ancient times beoause the diplomatio documents refer to them as the anoient treaties. c.f.
British Doouments on the Origins of the World War.
Vol. I, los. i!, 91:" - -

-

2. British Parliamentary Acoounts and Papers

1899, OII

t090S!}. pp. 6Sff.

---

3.,. Jones, Guernsey. "Beginnings of the Oldest
European Allianoe: England and Portugal," A.meric8.D
H1s1orical Assooiation Report !2.!: llil~ It 407.

4. Ibid., p. 407.

2

alterations the relations between England and
Portugal have been essentially the same for almost
three oenturies, unshaken by wars and revolutions
involVing either or both states.

Truly this is a

phenomenon of extraordinary rarity in international
relations.

A~

first oonsideration it might even

seem queer, beoause of the laok of oommon interests
and similarity of raoe, but allianoes are not built
upon oommunity or raoe, religion, or ideals, to say
nothing of sentiment or affeotion, but upon oommnnitl

_...................

of fears. 1

England and Portugal have never lacked

oODlJlon enemies.
An examination of the content of this ancient

treaty and its successors provides ample proof of

-

commi tments tbs t England made to Portugal and vice
,

versa.

These created a unique and rather embarrassing

diplomatic situation for England when Germany undertook to negotiate with her for Portugal's oolonie.
during the years 1898-191'.
Tne Treaty of 1373, conoluded just four years
before the death of Edward II, oame as a result of the
Hundred Years War, whioh involved by this time, not
only Franoe and England, but also Castile.

--

1. Jones, loo. oit., p. 40V.

Henoe. it

3

was deoidedly benefioia1 for England to enlist th.
ald of the Portuguese.

The treaty gave immediate

ald to England, but put restraints on her in subsequent dealings relative to Portugal.

The follow-

ing articles from the treat,v themselves explain
these restraints:
TREATY SIGNED AT LONDON. JUNE 16, 1373

Article I
In the first place, we settle and covenant
that there shall be from thle day forward between
our above said Lord Edward, King of 'England and
:l'rance, and Lord :l'erdlnand, King of Portugal and
Algarve, and the Lady Eleanor, Queen and his
consort, the ir suooessors in the aforesaid Kingdoms ••• and their realms, landa, dominions.
proVinces • • • true. faithful, oonetant. mutual
and perpetual [friendehip)
they shall henceforth
reCiprocally be friends to friends and enemie. to
enemies and shall aSSist, maintain, and uphold
each other mutually by sea and by land against
all men that may live or die, of whatever dignity.
station, rank or oondition that may be and against
the ir re alms and do mini ons. 1

They shall strive for peaoe, as much as in
them lies, and personal safety, seourity, int!rest
and honor, and the harmlessness, conserTation and
restitution of their rights, propertj, ettec~s ant
friends, wheresoever they be.
They shall everywhere faithfully prevent the
hurts and injuries, disgrace, or baseness whioh
they mow or whi ch one party knows to be at any
future time intended or contemplated against the
other party, and shall provide remedies for them;
••• without reserve, and fully inform, forewarn
and successfully counsel the other party against
whom such things are meditating • • • •

x.

Undersooririg mine.

Article II
Also, neither party shall form friendships
with the enemies, rivals or persecutors of the
other party or knowingly himself or through
others advise, aid or favour the enemies, rivsls,
or persecutors of the other party, to his detriment, hurt, or prejudice; or gratify them in any
way, receive them into his kingdom or lands,
or knowingly suffer them to be gratified,
reoeived, oounterbalanoed, or harboured, either
publicly or privately under any specious exouses,
oontrivances or pretexts • • •
Also, if the kingdoms, lands, dominions, or
places of the other party should happen to be
infested, oppressed or invaded by sea or by land,
by enemies, (etc.:j, or if any of these •••
prepare in any manner or appear • • _ anxious to
infest or oppress • • _'iaid shall be given] .1
Over five oenturies before 1898 England had
already bound herself to preserve Portugal's dominions,
strive for the conservation of Portuguese rights and
property, prevent everywhere injuries and disgraoe
which she knew were even oontemplated against her ally,
maintain straightforth oommunioation to Portugal of
any information that involved the safety of Portugal
and refuse to give comfort to the rivals of Portugal.
Of course, at the time of the signing of the treaty
England received much in return for suoh self-denying
limitations.

Portugal acted as a bulwark against her

continental rivals.
Thirteen years later in 1386 the clauses of the

1. BritiSh Parliamentary Accounts
!!!. !!i., pp. 67-69.

~

Papers,

1373 Treaty were re-emphasized in a new treaty

executed at Windsor.

Evidence of this can be

espeoially noted in Clause VII.
TREATY SIGNED AT WINDSOR, MAY 9. 1386

Article VII
Further it is agreed that if either of the
aforesaid parties oan learn, discover, or antioipate any injury, oontumely or disadvantage
to have been planned or meditated against the
other party, on sea or land, manifestly or
privately, he shall prevent it aa muoh as in
him lies, as though he were desirous of preventing the ~jury and contumely intended to his own
interest and Shall endea.vor by all means 1n his
power, that such deSign, With all the particulars oonnected with it may be brought to the
notioe of the other party against which it 1.
so intended... and e",err artifioe, d,oeit, and
tnvention anall be abstained from.l
Between 1386 and 1642 there was an intermilsion
of treaty making; nevertheless good relations were
maintained beoause the two powers never seemed to be
Without oommon enemies.

Then, too, the growing in-

fluence of the commercial classes in an inorea.singly
powerful English government made inevitable the continuanoe of the advantages that oould be had from
judioiously manipulating this Willing pswn. 2
In 1642 a treaty was concluded between the

English House of Stuart and Portuguese House of

1. BrItISh Parliamentary
l!!.2.. .2.U.., pp. 69-'10.

ACcounts and Papers,
. -

--

2. Jones, loc. cit., pp. 407-8.

. . . . _--

-

..

_--------

6

Braganza which gave to the English merchants in
portugal a reasonable amount of religious toleration,
protection from financial losses resultant from the
Inquisition plul extra-territorialitl and immunit7
from Portuguese lawl. l In addition to these valuable
oonoessione the oontracting powers reiterated their
previous deolaration of mutual trust and assistanoe
when they guaranteed to each other in Article I of
the Treaty Signed at London, Januar7 29, 1642 that,
••• Neither of the said most renowned KiAgB,
their heir. and euooessor by himself or aD7
other, ehall do or attempt against each other
or their Kingdoms by land or by Bea nor shall
they oonsent or adhere unto any war counsel, or
Treaty in prejudioe of the other. 2
For a time it seemed that the Puritan Revolution would destroy the understanding between Catholic
and Pro-Stuart Portugal end the now more or le88
Protestant England.

In faot Portugal was the only
power to espouse overtly the Stuart oause. S Portugal

had always been friendly to the Stuarts.

She afforded

Charles I access to the rest of Europe by allowing her
ambassadors and diplomatic offices to be used for

1. liii¥ls; lr.ttamentari A§coua\s and Paper@,

--

loc. oit., pp.

&- •

2. Ibid., p. 71. .

z.

--

Jones, loc. cit., p. 411.

'1

oommunioation and even for the transportation of
money and smmunition. l Suoh aotion naturally
brought dawn on Portugal's head the wrath of the
avenging Republio and postponed oonsiderably (26
years) the inevitable final form of the AngloPortuguese Allianoe.

In fact, for 3ust a ahort

time there was a state of war between Portugal and
the Proteotorate when the Royal "Pirates" Maurioe
and Rupert took refuge in the fagus RiTer.
well blookade' Portugal.
bJ 'eolaring war.

Crom-

King John IV retaliate'

However, he was powerless to do

more than imprison English merchants and sequestrate
propertf.

So when the Republioan Victory of Dunbar

indicated the real strength of England, John Bued
for peaoe. which Oromwell agreed to by exeouting another treaty in

l6~4.

This treaty granted England

a oonsiderable indemaity and added to the meroantilistio concessions she had alrea~ seoured.! After
this treaty was signed Englishmen shared equal privilegea with the Portuguese in the Portuguese colonies.
It also reemphasized and repeated what had been
guaranteed before:

--

1. Jones, 100. oit., pp. 409-416.

-

2. Ibid., p. 411.

8

It is also agreed and oonoluded that no
other league or confederaoy whatsoever made or
to be made by the most Serene Lords, the Protector of England and the King of Portugal,
with &n1 other prince. or republios whatsoever
shall derogate from the present treaty of peace
and alliance, but that the peace and confederai'l'
shall be kept entire and alw~8 in full foro •• ~
E'ven more than the Treaty of 1642 the agreement
of 1654 was regarded as a charter of liberties for
Engli8h in Portugal.!

It is interesting to observe

that although Portugal was the only nation to oppose
the Republio openly it was also the first to Bend a
credited ambassador to the "Parliament and Commonwealth
of England. e3 So, despite sentiment, Portugal

W88

more interested in England and not English governments.
Although the relations between the two countries
during the Pnritan interlude were fraught with tenSion,
the relations again beoame reciprooally helpful and
friendly.

As early as 1660, Portugal was obliged to

call upon the despised republio for aid against her
enemias.

A treaty with the usual Anglo-Portuguese

assurances was oonoluded.

It was about to go into

effect when the Restoration dissolved the Commonwealth.

1. BrItiSh J.Sarliamentm looounts and gaper!.

--

loc. oit., p.

1:

2. Jones,

'

,

~. ~.,

3. Ibi4., p. 412.

p. 413.

9

When Charles II returned to England he hal
intended to reverse the entire foreign polioy of
Cromwell.

However, his oonneotions with France and

negotiations for the marriage with Catherine of
Braganza by his ohief minister, Clarendon. soon
postulated a reversal of his original intentione. l
!be marriage of the two dynasties gave the
penultimate touch to the allianoe,

It was not a

sudden deoision, for a proposal for marriage was made
in

1",.2

It had long been a oheriShed wish of Por-

tugal's John IV.S The matter was again disousee'
just atter the execution of Charles I.
was found to be sympathetic.

Charles II

Throughout the Puritan

orisis the Royal House of Braganza had extended aid
and sy.mpath7 to the dispo8sessed oooupants of the
House of Stuart.

When Charles returned to England

wifele.s, he provided in himself the keystone of
I

I'

English foreign policy which was in truth merely a
oorol1ary of that of Louis XIV." During hie exile

cit., p. 413.
2. Ibid., pp. 409-410.

1. Jones,

100.

3. Ward, A. W. and Goooh, G. P., ~ Cambridge
History ~ British Foreign PoliOI, I, 16.
,. Green, John Richard, History
Peopl., III, 236ff.

~

the English

10

Charles was obliged to depend upon the Tarying
hespi tality of Lo111s' K1ngdom.
amount of gratitude was due.

So

to him a certain

However, Charles did

not fall in line with Louis so much out of gratitude
as he did beoauae he knew that only by the aid of
Louie would he be able to realize his aims.

He knew

that Louis was deSigning to reduoe Spain to a8 near
a state of Tassalage as pOSSible and that Loui.
ne ede d English support to make his hegemony complete.
By marrying himself to Portugal t an ally of France
and foe of Spain, as he had his sister, Henrietta,
to the Dnke of Orleans, Charles aligned himself.
though not formally but nevertheless, definitely,
with France.

Of course, Charles reoeiTed something

in return for the marriage conveniently arranged b7
hiB loyal Clarendon.

He reoeived the subsidies of

Louis whioh made possible his independenoe from
Parliament and luxurious and profligate life.

How~

eTer, England as a nation, too, reoeived oonsiderable
material returns, not from LOUis, but from Portugal,
which helped more than a little in laying the foundationa for the domination of the Mediterranean and
India. l

The English received a dowry of half a

--

1. Jones, loc. oit., p. i19.

11

Ddllion pounds--fabulous in those daY8--the fortress
of Tangier in the Mediterranean. the trading center
of Bombay, India, and political pledges of religious
toleration for all Englishmen throughout the Portuguese Empire. l At first this arrangement was
distasteful to the English people as a whole, for it
oame at the same time that Charles arranged for the
disposal of Dunkirk to Louis XIV.!

The people did not

relish trading hard-won Dlmkirk for diatan t Tangier,
nor did they like the growing power

0

f the SUn Kine

whose Bourbon Dyna8ty was beginning to be as muoh o'f
a specter to them as the now waning House of Hapsburg
had onoe been. 3
Nevertheless, by sealing this bargain, sinoe
aid to Portugal was a steady Frenoh policy, England
ranged herself on the side of France as a foe of
Spain and a8 suoh contributed muoh to the downfall of
her former rival and perseoutor.' With English and
French support Portugal was able to insure for all
time her independenoe from Spain for whioh she had

1. Green,
England

~.

oii.,

p.

237.

2. Macaulay, Thomas Ba b1ngton, The History of
!!:2!! !!l!. Aocession .21 James II71, 1'19. -

-

3. Ibid., p. 179.
4. Green,

~.

!!i., p. 237.
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been struggling for sixty years. l

So just aa

Spain reached her pinnacle of greatness in Portugal,
she started there, too, her downfall.!

As

event.

subsequently proved, this downfall was continuall7
aided and abetted thenceforth by the maintenance of
the Anglo-Portuguese Alliances.
There was still another factor in the conolusian of this alliance.

That 11, the mercantilistic

Clarendon was extremely eager and energetio in
inserting commeroial clauses in the wedding treaty,
in an attempt to make the marriage to the Cathol10
Infanta more palatable for meroantil1stio and
Protestant England. 3
This union then, of Charles and the Infanta
of Portugal not only aligned Charles with Louis
but was open admission that Cromwell's suocessful fpreign policy was to be resumed. 80
de.pite the Puritan restoration interlude and
oomio opera Anglo-Portuguese war of 1642, there
waa no real alteration in the relations of
Portugal and England ••
The marriage was formally sealed by treaty on
June 23, 1661 at Whitehall.

The first article and

secret article of this treaty are interesting because

1.

Jones, log. Cit., pp.

iOB-9.

2. Green, ,2R.. cit. t p. 23'1.

Ward and Gooch, £R.. ill,.,

3. Jones, loc. oit. , p. 415.

4.

p. 29.

11

they specifioally bind the signers to abide by all
previous treaties and to protect all conquests of
both from all enemies, both present and future.
Article I
That all Treaties made between Great Britain
and Portugal since 1641 until this very time
shall be ratified and·confirmed in all pOints
and to all intents, and shall recei VEt as full
force and ratification by this treaty as if the7
were herein particularly mentioned and inserted
word by word.
Secret Articles
His Majesty of Great Britain in regard of
the great advantages and increase of dominion he
hath purchased by the abOTe mentioned treaty of
marriage shall promise and oblige himself as by
this present article he doth to defend and
protect ell oonquests or colonies belonging to
the Crown of Portugal against all his enemi ••
as well future as present. l
From this time on the arrangements between
Portugal and England remained extraordinarily constant
and were neTer subject to ohange--merely re-emphaaie
of the original theme--that is, with the exception in
the years 1898-191' which is the raison d'.tre of this
discussion.
If some authorities neglect or refuse to oonsider the earlier foundation of the "Oldest Alliance,·
none deny that 1661 marks the beginning of thi8
relationship.

Even this date gives it ample claim

1. BritiSh Parliamentary Iocounts and Papers,
loc • cit., p. '12.
-

--

14

for the moat durable of all understandings--over
two hundred and fifty years.
The remaining treaties that were concluded
in subsequent years comprise a mere oatalogue of
reaesurances~-England's

rise to world leadership

bears witness of this point throughout.
During the War of Spanish Secession, Portugal,
true to her obligations, adhered to England and beoame a member 0 f the Grand A11iance. 1 To bolster
and olarify their relations the allies reaffirme'
their intentions toward eaoh other by another treaty.
which reads in part as follows:
TREATY SIGNED AT LISBON, MAY 16, 1'03
Article I
All former treaties between the above said
powers (England and Portugal) are hereby approve4
and confirmed and ratified and ordered to be
exaotly and faithfully observed exoept ineofar
a8 by the present treaty is otherwise provided
and estab1iehe4. 2
At the Peace of Utreoht after this war England
was instrumental in seouring concessions for Lisbon. 3

•

Barnes,

!2.2..

2. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers,
,gji., p.

R!

3. Ward and Gooch,

-

~.

oit •• p. 54.
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During the Seven Years War Portugal was invaded by
Spain beoause she refused to end all correspondence
and commerce with England. l However. by supplementing the national resources of Portugal. England aoon
offset the effects of the invasion. 2 During our
American Revolution, Portugal was briefly at war
with Spain, America's ally.1
The Portuguese seT.rumen. remained steadfast
to England during the Napoleonic struggles even when
the homeland was taken over by the Empire of France.
In 1807 Portugal was the only country whose ports
were excluded from the restriotions of the Orders in
Council.

Later in the same year when Franoe move' in

on Portugal, the British persuaded the Portuguese
government to fle. from the homeland to Brazil rather
than capitulate to Napoleon's demands by even so muoh
a8

a token war on England.'

The British reoeived

permission to use the Ports of Madeira and the
Portuguese Fleet. 1

1.

2. Ibid. , p. 123.

3.

-

Ward and Gooch, .Qlt. cit., p •

!l!!i.•• p. 166.

4. Ibid •• p. 365.
5. Ibid. , p. 365.

121.
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There was a treaty of Rio de Janeiro, '
signed between England and the Portuguese government
in exile, February 19, 1810 to fit the peculiarities
of the Napoleonic situat1on. l This treaty was abrogated in 1810 when a new one was instituted, Which
again put the Anglo·Portuguese relations in their
customary place.

Article III explains this entire

situation:
The Treaty of Alliance concluded at Rio d.
Janeiro on the 19th of February, 1810, being
founded on circumstances of a temporary nature,
which have happily ceased to exist, the said
treaty i8 said to be v01d in all parts and of
no effeot, without prejudice to the Ancient
Treaties of Allianoe, Friendsh1p and Guarantee
which hereby renewed by the High Ccntractin,
Powers and e.clmcwle dged to be in full force
and effect.!
After the Napoleonic furor, England sank into
comfortable and "splendid isolation."

In fact, for

a period of more than fifty years she had no permanent
al17. except little Portugal.
In 1871 when there were republican agitations
in Spain for an annexation of Portugal to Spain,
England stood up for Portugal by informing the Spanish
Minister that she would brook no external interference
~.

1. BritiSh Pgliamentary Aocounts and Papers,
p. 1i.

£i!.,

2. Ibid., p. 79.
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the affairs of her a1ly.l
In 1875 Portugal's colonial possessions in

the vicinity of De1agoa Bay in MOzambique, one of
the colonies invo1Ted in the German negotiations,
offered specific grounds for negotiation between
England and her old ally.2

The Bay itself had been

the object of nUDerous counter conquest claims by
Holland, England, Portugal end eTen Austria; although
Portugal claimed it first by right of discovery.

AI

late as 1861 the British ship Narcissus raised the
British flag over the territory.

Portugal protested

but hostl1ities did net deTe10P between these two
contenders and friends of convenience.

Instead it

was finally decided to allow Marshal MacMahon,
President of France, to act as arbitrator. 3 Evidently,
~gland

was not too certain of her claims because the

British minister to LisboA requested in a note to
Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs that although
a deCision had not yet been reached by Marshal

1. !fltish Documents ~ th8 orii¥s of the War
1898-191', !, 51-2, No. 69, encIi": JL)7 anr~3.
2. Bixler, Raymond, Ang1~-German Imperialism
1880-1900, pp. 04-5.

!A South Afrioa

3 .. British and Forei~ State payers, 1872-'3,
LXIII, l045H. (Clte'lby Bi er, gjl. o·t., pp. 104-5.)
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MacMahon, Great Britain and Portugal should enter
into mutual agreement to the effect that the power
in whose favor the award was made not "entertain any
proposal for the acquisition of this territory until
the defeated claimant had an oppo.rtuni ty of making
the successful claimant a reasonable offer for the
acqui8ition of that territory either by purchase or
some other oonsideration. nl The British minister
implied that sooh an aoquiai tion by a third partr
would damage the oOnfidence and seourity of relations. 2
In replr to thiS, Portugal gave her fUllest assurances.
Marshal MaoMahoJl deoided in favor of Portugal, who
still has sovereignty over the area.
The episode has more than passing interest for
this thesis, because of the relation of the Delogoa
Bay area to the negotiations of 1898 with Germany and
."

Portugal.

Closely related to this question was a

treaty signed between the two allies, June 11, 1891.
This treaty defined the spheres of influenoe of eaoh
in Africa and safeguarded British interesta in Delagoa
Bay-

Artiole VII of the treaty points this out:

1. BiXler, !.E.. cit., p. 105.
E. British poreit? and State Papers, LXX,
70, pp. 318 (oited by Bixler, U. oi~.,
pp. 10",-101).

1878-9, NO.
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• • • The two powers agree that in the event
of one of them proposing to pert with ally of
the territories to the south of the Zambesl
assigned by these articles to theirrespeotive
spheres of influenoe the other shall be
reoognize' as possessing a preferential right
to the territories in question or &l17 portion..
of them upon terms similar to those propo8e4.~
In 1894 Great Britain. fearing that GermanJ
might aOQ,\1ire nelagoa Bay, informed the Portuguese
gOT8rnment that she would not part with 8IlJ right.
whioh would diminiSh the value of preferential claims
granted to her in that area. 2
Relatione between Portugal and her protector
remained the same until 1898 when GerlIlS.l17 began to
negotiate with England for possible acquisition of
Portuguese colonies.

These negotiations, of course,

cast some doubt on the possible status of England
and Portugal's alliance.

,

However, Within a year

after 1898. England had conoluded another treat7
with Portugal which reaffirmed the old relation.
This was the 80-oalle' "Treaty of Windsor" and waB
signed on the 14th of October 1899 to give England
reassurance of Portugal's attitude in the use of the
Port of Lorenco Marques in Portuguese East Afrioa

1. BritiSh FQrei~ and state Papers, 1890-91,
LXXXII. 32 (cited by Bix:er, ~. ~., pp. 104·5).
2. Bixler,

~.-2!i.,

pp. 107-8.
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by England in the event of a war with Transvaal. l
This treaty, of course, showed that England
still had advantages to gain from her Portuguese
friendship and intended to keep them--her negotiations with Germany notwithstanding.

The truth. of

this intention is evinced yet again when England
signed a treaty for arbitration of mutual disputes
at Windsor, November 16, 1904.

!he preamble to this

is very similar to the numerous venerable treat18s
of the past:
WINDSOR TREATY

Being moreover desirous of confirming, b7
a further solemn Agreement, the friendship and
alliance whiCh have happily subsisted for so
long a period between them, and the two nation.
which they represent, and of eliminating as far
as possible, from their mntual relations.
everything which might tend to impair or weaken
that friendship and alliano, [a treaty of
arbitration i8 conclude4J 2
fhis treat,. was renewed in 1909 by Sir Edward
Gre,. for a period of five years.
The treaties of 1898, 1904, and 1909 have
more than passing significance in that they were a
series of treaties steadfast to the age-old friend8hip

1. See Appendix
declaration.

D for

the text of this

2. Briti8h FOrei!! and State Papers, 97, pp. 68-9.
This treaty is the real reaty of Windsor--rather than
the Declaration of 18t9.

!l

and yet renewed at a time that they were oounter
to the more recent German treaty of 1898.

The

resolution of this enigmatio situation requires an
investigation-of European conditiona between 18981914.

fhe diplomatic evidence of the treaties
leaves no doubt that England oonsistently wante'
the friendship of her small ally, Portugal.

Both

countries received much benefit from this mutual
"

understanding.

Portugal had constant proteotion

from her two large neighbors, Yranoe and Spain, ani
a collaborator in certain eolonial negotiation. in
Afrioa.

She also had a ready market for her princi-

pal produot, port wine, whose entire export trade
centered in the English market, because of special
privileges dating baok to Methuen's treaty of 1703. 1
England in return had a constant springboard for
continental wars and a wedge between Spain and France,
as well as valuable commeroial rights.

The treat7

series indeed had its advantages, but also ita liabilities.

England sometimes found that this friendship

went oontrary to the opportunistio policy of "muddling
through."

It also obligated her sometimes When ahe

i. War! and

~Oocht

!L.

~., p.

166.
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would not have been.

Then too, the English national

disease of gout might be attributed by some

&8

a

direct outgrowth of the treaty of Methuen, ainoe
practically the entire output of port wine was sent
to England as a result of this treaty.

CHAPTER II
ENGLAND, GERMANY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE
IN' 1898

CHAPTER II
ENGL.UD, GERMA.BY AND THE INTERNATIONAL seED
in 1898
With the approach of the Twentieth Century
there was a tremendous ohange in the value s of international relations.

The German and Italian wars of

national unifioation ushered in a whole .eries of
new problems and rivalries.

The European oontinent

was being divided into armed camps whose relative
power was evenly enough balanoed to give eaoh one
reason to pause before antagonising the other. l
Although international relations were still
being oarried out aooording to the archaio practices
inherited from the old dynastic subject-state system,!
the technological changes that the Twentieth Centur7
had fostered and the expansion of rival imperialisms
presagtd an imminent ohange.

International problems

no longer were of a striotly European oharaoter.
Signs were rapidly appearing whioh indioated that
the next oonflict of interests would be worldwide.
The world was undergoing a "diplomatic revolution"

1. Ward and Goooh,
p. 3.

~.

oit.,

III, 266.

2. Hale, Oron James, Publioity

~

Diplomaol,

2'
which required international problems to be settled
on inoreasingly broader general lines. l
This revolution ha4 been given impetus by
the resignation of Bismarck from the international
scene.

The absenoe of his diplomatic sagaoity wa.

soon notioed in the Weltpolitik policy of Germany_
However, the revolution was in the making even before
this.

It started with the beginning of Germany's

Pan-German and colonial aspirations, sweeping. in
spite of his well-founded oonviotions to the contrary,
even the solid Bismarck into the ourrent whioh was
to lead his GerIDall7 into the maelstrom of .elboli tik.
When Germany became a colonial power she did
much to upset the balanoe of Europe.

German oolonial

dreams and sohemes very soon created rivalries and
hostilities, prinoipally with England. 2 ~his rivalry,
ooupled with Germany's new navy program, whos. purpo .. by lets left no illusion to the "two-power
standard" theorists of England, eventually forced
England into one of the hostile oamps.

Therefore,

Bismarck's earlier acquiescence to a colonial empire

1. Seton-Watson, R. W., BritaIn in Eiirope,

p. 596.-

p. 771.

2. Larson, L. M.,

! Short History of England,

later provided a logioal exouse for a large navy.
Thus he unwittingly laid the groundwork for England's final deoision to participate in the Triple
Entente and the inability of Germany to arrive at
an alliance agreement.

with England was
a oardinal polioy with the Iron Chanoellor. l He
was e"an opposed to a

~riendship

~rma.n

navy powerful enough to

.gitate England.! What he did not sae was that hia
supposedly innoouous oolonial polioy, when administered by hands other than his own, was to beoome the
stimulant that upset the equilibrium of hi. plan for
Germany'. seourity and prasaged a fatal navy rivalry
as well.
But in the early 1890's no one could yet foretell what the situation eventually would be and that
Germany would be more hostile to England than
other power.

~

.111 that was evident was a ohange in

world politics whioh was definitely unfavorable to
England's favored position.

At the time German agita-

tion was only one of a large number of perplexing
problems that could not be olearly understood because

1. Count ti1hetm von Bismarck 'EO Ohanceiior
Bismarck, August 19, 1885, Grosse Politik der
Europai8ohen Kabtnette, IV,
~

1a,.
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diplomate and statesmen were still grasping at
pt1nolple. whose usefulness had already slipped awa7
with the approach of rapid oommunioation and the
machine age.
In fact. in 1887. England had made a friendl,
en tent e wi th Italy. one 0 f Ge rmany' s partners in the
Triple Allianoe. l FaBdly relatiOns between Windsor
and Potsdam were very oordial. 2

These relations were

oordial enough to give the final impetus to Russia to
enter into an entente with Franoe.

Thus England,

for a time at least, was not in suoh an unfavorable
position with referenoe to Germany.

In faot, she waa

in a position to cast a deoiding vote between the two
sides that were now forBdng. 3
this.

Germ8lt1' did not realise

As yet, most of the British diplomats oould

not grasp the situation beoause of their enoumbranoe
by the policy of the past.

Both powers were at an

important historical crossroad and did not know that
they were.

m

the 1890's in England foreign relations were

still influenoed by the timeworn prinoiple of isolation,
p. 125.

i. jiay, !hdiiey :B. t Origins

-

0

f the Worid War,

2. Ibid., p. 125.
3. Seton-Watson • .2R,• .!!i., p. 5'10.

2'1
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often oalled, "splendid," but at beat. preoarious.

England, Binoe
of the seas.

~rafalgar,

was the undisputed mistress

She, therefore, enjoyed an independenoe

of aotion rarely obtained b7 other powers of that
day.

Her geographio insularity further amplified

her aloofness from nearby European problema, whioh
for her were never so muoh oauses of a Bet system of
polioy

8S

tnni ties.

individual motivations for partioular opporAfter Napoleon, England's oabinet trimmed

her ssils more and more to a line of aotion epitomized
by Canning's famous phrase "with every British
Minister the interests of England ought to be the
shibboleth of his policy."l

The only set polioy was

that of opportunism or what is more oommonly known as

the polioy of "muddling through.-

For over fifty

years England steered away from permanent alliance.
with any oontinental nation.
Portugal.

The sole exoeption was

The "deviliah" Palmerston epitomlzed this

polioy well by stating:
I say it is a narrow polioy to suppose that
this country or that is to be marked out as the
eternal aUy or the perpetual enemy of England.
We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual
enemie.. Our interests are eternal and perpetual
and those interests it is our duty to follow. 2
1. Seton-latson, ~. ~.t p. 459.

-

2. Ibid., p. 459.
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Suoh a viewpoint was 1nherited by the oonservative ministry of Lord Salisbury.

His work at

the end of the century attempted to follow the old
policy.

In many respeots, however, he began to

realize some need to cooperate in continental
matters.

But even though he frequently inolined to

cooperation, he was partioularly adverse to pledging
England in a4vanoe to act on oiroumstanoes which had
not yet ariaen. l He was oonstantly adveree to formal allianoes. 2
In fact, it was only when the danger of war

with South Africa appeared that English diplomaoy
began to understand clearly its position in relation
to the other aspiring empires stimulated by the opening of new areas of the world, scientific achievements,
the development of large scale industry and oommerce
and the inorease of population.

These sought an out-

let for their energies whioh might preserve the precariOUS balanoe in ~rop •• 8 In going overseas,
however, these powers actually caused the upset which

x.

Temperley, Harold and Penson, L!llian,
Foundations ~ British Foreign Poliol. p. 621.
8. Ward and Gooch,
3. Ibid., p. 267.

~. ~.,

II, 261.
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they sought to avoid. l

England. the earliest of

the expansionists, had contiguous conflicting interests in almost every seotion of the earth where
the others tried to stake a claim.
England was faced with the perpetual Russian
effort to expand her Empire in directions that were
dangerous to her colonial possessions.

The Russian

danger was particularly perplexing because the large
Russian land mass made it possible for that country
to spread farther afield without enoountering the
dangers of the British fleet on the high seas where
alone she was supreme.
BritiSh claims and interests encountered
Russia's at pOints widely separated over the world.
Russia's expansion into Manchuria was seriously
menacing England's commercial and naval superioritr
in the orient. 2

The oolossal weight of the Tsarist

Empire was being felt more and more on the borders
of England's Indian Empire. 3 Russia was continnal17
nipping a.t the heels of Tu.rkey whose maintenance
t

until late in Salisbury's ministry England regarded

1. Ward and Gooch, !!. oit., II!. 26t.
2. Fay, ££. cit., pp. 128-9.
3. Ward and Gooch,

~. ~.,

III, 267.
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a8 an essential to her imperial safety.l Likewise
England had incurred the hostility of France 1J1
eeveral instances.

Lord Edward Grey, Foreign

Minister of England during the World War gave the
folloWing picture of the si tu,ation:
• • • There was constant friction, rising on
the slightest provooation to quarrel ani hostility, between Great ~ritain and France or
Russia. The ground swell of ill~will never
0888ed. British interests touched those o~
France and Russia in IDaIq parts c f the World
and where interests touch, an atmosphere of
111-w111 i8 always dangerous. The blackest
suspicion thrives on it, like nonous growth
under dark skies in ~rk¥ air.2
Even previous to 1898, England had had considerable disagreement with France about the colleotion of debts and the gradual establishment of
suzerainty in Egypt.

In this situation Germany gave
some moral support to England. 3 Perhaps this was a
carry-over from Bismarck's policy of keeping France
and England disturbed so as to turn French eyes
Germ&nf.

However,

~ismarck

~rom

also encouraged Franc-e's

colonial policy at the same time so that there would

1. Fay. 2R.

~., p.

12'.

2. Grey, EdWard, Twentl Five Years, II, 11.
3. Nicholson. Harold, Portrait of a Diplomatiat (Sir Arthur Nicholson), p. Oi.
---

-

31

be bad blood between England and Frsnce. l

England

also had to be careful of French expansion in the
Indo-Chinese area.!

In l89S there was considerable

hostility about the Nigerian boundary in Africa. 3
Ma30r Marchand of Franoe and General Kitohener of
England met under warlike conditions in the disputed
African area.

This was but the final of a series of

unfriendly event. between the two anoient enemiea.
An early war appeared to be inevitable.

While England was faced with all of this
rivalry Germany was making her own late bid.

MOat

of the unolaimed territory of the world at that time
was situated in one of the moat disputed areas,
namely, Afrioa.

Germany beoame a neighbor of Eng-

land on both the east and west ooast of Africa.
She attained these separated areas just in time to
oompete at oross purposes with the remainder of the
•

Afrioan oolonial powere in attempting to join their
various scattered possessions.

Cecil Rhodes wa.

beginning to conjure up his visions of the Cape-to-

1. Sehm1tt Bernadotte, England
l'.O-19li, p. 15l.
t

2. Ward and Goooh,
3. Fay, !£.

~.t

~. ~.,

p. 128.

~

Germani

VIII, 288.
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Cairo empire.

On top of all of this, Italy was

making a bid for Abyssinia.

Of all of England's

danger spats, Afrioa provided the greatest number
of possibilities of an open confliot.

In spite of

the Anglo-German treaty of la9€) by Whioh England was
given all German olaims to Afrioan Zanzibar for
European Helgoland, relations gradually, almost
imperoeptibly, beoame strained by a oontinuous
suooession of these events.
Potentially the Krueger Telegram episode waa
just suoh an oooasion.
Ger~

It further indicated that

already was not anxious to build up diploma-

tic oordieli ty between herself and England, the
deolarations of the Kaiser end the lineup of Europe
to the oontrary notwithstanding.

This evidence

becomes more pointed when one observes that the
date of the raid was 1896, two years before 1898
when Chamberlain's bid for a German alliance was
refused by Germany.

Yet the effeots of the event

were distinctly felt years after its ocourrenoe.

It

was a orisis that oould have led to an eolipse of
British supremaoy in South Afrioa.

As it finall,.

resolved itself, the resulting suspioions of German
reaotions beoame a permanent feature in Anglo-German
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relations. l

Retrospective examination indicates

that the gradual deterioration of English and German
relations had definitely begun with the Jameson Raicl
and its direot result, the Kaiser's telegram to
President Krueger of Transvaal. 2

Germany's conduct

in this situation was the initiating cause of the
final breakdown of Bismarck's policy of friendship
with England.
For some years prior to 1896, because of her
South African colonial interests, Germany had been
extremely friendly with the Boer Republic, England's
big problem in lower Afrioa for over a generation. 3
In fact, this friendliness with the Boers grew in
proportion to the animoSity that developed between
the Germans and the English.

Economio and political

relationships became so intimate between the German
and Boer by the middle of the "nineties" that Germany
oontrolled over a fifth of the foreign investment. in
the Boer Republios.'

Big commercial houses froll

1. darro!l, E. M., Germany ~ the Great
Power" 1866-1914, p. Z62. .
2. Lovell, R. I. !h!. struggle !2!:. South
Africa, p. 368.
3. Brandenburg, Erioh, !t2!! Bismarck to !!1!.
World !!I,, p. 80.
t

4. Carroll,

~. ~.,

pp. 362-3.
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Germany maintained thriving branches ill Pretoria
and Johannesburg.
The Germans had a sentimental s37lIlpathy for
the Boers as well as a materialistic one.

They

regarded these Dutch farmers sa a. "small people of
Germanic blood struggling to maintain their independence" despite the pressure of a. colossal Englsnd. l For these reasons the colon1al enthusiasts
of GermaIlY had long earmarked the srea as a desirable
and likely possession--of, if not a position, at
least s means of challenging and blocking British
superiority in South Africa.

•

This viewpoint wsa

exemplified when President Xrueger to s large group
of Germans assembled st Pretoris on the Ksiser's
birthday expressed his gratitude for past German aid
and confidence for future help.

England protested

that aocording to the Treaty of Pretoria (1884) and
the convention of London (approved by Bismarck, 1881).
the Republic oould not independently make &n7
arrangement with a foreign power.

Germsny showed

her stsnd by promptly informing England that her
interests required an economically independent Transvaal. with open c01DDlWliostioll from Pretoria to Delsgoa

1. Carroll,

~.

cit., pp. 362-3.
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Bay in Portuguese Mozambique. l
These oomments ooinoided with German aotions
in the conatruction of the railroad from the Portuguese Mozambique port of LorenBo Marques to Pretoria.
This was the Transvaal's only non-English outlet to
the sea.

The project received considerable financial

support from Germany.

Such action, threatening the

English position not only in the Transvaal but in
Portuguese East Afrioa was emphasized particularlr
by the appearsnce of two warships at the port and
the dispatch of a congratUlatory telegram to President
Kraeger by the Kaiser. 2 England had attempted to
forestall the damage this railroad would do to her
African Empire by securing a lease to Delagoa Bay,
the Mozambique terminus of the road. 3 This effort
was thwarted tn 1893 by Germany and the united States,
who interfered ostensibly because they feared that
suoh a lease would damage their holdings in the portuguese railroad. 4 Brandenburg even states that the
Anglo-German animsi ty had its inception at this

1. Carroll, .2R.. cit., p. 363.
2. Brandenburg. .2,2 •
3. Lovell,

.ill., p.

~. ~.,

4. Brandenburg,

~.

80 •

p. 342.
oit., p. 45.
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The railroad episode of July, 1895, was
still sore in the mincls of England and Germany When
Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador, made his
final leave of the German Emperor before replaoemente

In his oonversations he went beyond what a

oircumspeot farewell would require by remindins
William that Germany's attitude in reference to the
African situation and Boer problem could cau••
trouble.!

The Kaiser said that Malet even mentioned

"war for the sake

0

f a few square mile. of nigger.

and palB trees; war with Queen Viotoria's grandson
and England r s only friend."3

Salisbury. the Prime

Minister of England, expressed his surprise to the
German Ambassador when he learned of this remark and
stated that Malet had had no offioial instruotions to
make suoh a statement. 4

Lovall implies that Joseph

Chamberlain, the Colonial Seoretary, might have
inspired Malet to utter the remark. 5 However.

1. Brandenburg •

.2,;2 •

.ill.,

p.

45.

2. Carroll t .2,2. ill,., p. -364.

3. Kaiser's Ootober 29, 1895 Report of a Conversation with Colonel SWaine, G.P., VI, No. 2529.
4. Lovell, !.E.•

.2.ll., p.

5. Ibid., p. 354.

--
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3'
J. T. Garvin, Chamberlain'. apologist, supports
blet's deniel. of the remark. 1
Regardless of the emot wording of Malet' 8
remarks, the Kaiser's subsequent oomment. to the
British Military Attaohe, Colonel Swaine, show that
he might have even welcomed the excuse they or
similar remarks gave Germany to state her position.
In hi. comment. to Swaine, William
••• ended with a threat that if England continued to 'insult and fool' the Dreibund as she
had for the past seven years, he woUld be
'-.imply forced to make common cause with France
and Russia.' Britain, he conoluded, oould only
esoape from her isolation by 'coming out lUlre aervedly and openly on the side of the Triple
Allianoe or against it.'!
Here the Kaiser expose' himself and the ourrent
German polioy--to browbeat England and at the same
time "make great oapital out of this story, also for
possible naval demands to proteot our growing trade.- 3
Brandenburg substantiates this viewpoint somewhat,
eTen though he does place the Kaiser's remarks in a
more excusable setting.' The Kaiser had made up his

1. GarTin, J. L., Life of Joseph Chamberlain,

III, 65.

2. Seton-Watson, !£. £11., p. 576.
S. William II to Marschall October 25, 1895
(Note), G.P., XI, No. 2580.

--

4. Brandenburg,

~. ~.t

p. 81.
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mind that he was not gOing to treat England with
"kid gloves" any longer; if friendly persuasion
wouldn't do the triok, intimidation would.

He wa.

resolved to show definitely to England the dangers
of isolation and how muoh she needed Germanyl_-at
Germany's price, however.
At the time that Malet made this purported
statement, Marschall, the German Foreign Seoretary,
stated that the German government's interests in the
Boer Republio had of necessity to oppose any possible
inoorporation of those states into British Rhodeaia.
Public opinion in Germany demanded that the government make such a stand.!

He oountered Malet'a

remarks by saying England could not afford to antagonise Germany beoause she had too many enemies. 3
Germany's stand was based on insistent reports that
Rhodes' South African Company was plotting a revolt
of the· Ui tlander8 1n the Transvaal."
Such was the situation when news flashed over
the world that Dr. Jameson, Cecil Rhodes' administrator

1.
XI, 5.

Lovell, ,2£. oi t.

,

p. 363.

--

2. Marschall's Report October 15, 1895, G.P.,

-

3. Ibid. , pp .. 5-7.
4. Carroll, .2l?-
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of the South Afrioan COmpaDT'8 territories and
head of private oompany polioe, had crossed the
border with six hundred men into the Transvaal.
The avowed purpose of this raid was to come to the
aid of an uprising of persecuted English Uitlanders
(aliens), supported by money and arms from RhOdes. l
!he conspiracy was a complete fiasco.

How-

eTer. it might have had some chanoe for success had
it been confined to an internal reTolt of Uitlanders
desiring a "new republio."

But, when the Jameson

party, coming from South African Company territor,r,
was superimposed upon the "internal revolt," the
plot failed.
the uprising

Jameson disregarded a postponement of
and

impatiently "jumped his gun" on

December 29, 1895.

As a

result, the Uitlanders

were forced hastily to summon their men together at
an extreme disadvantage.

They were easily overoome

by President Krueger's troops at Krugersdorp.

This

"putsch" was definitely Rhodes' responsibility.

The

British Cabinet had no part in the raid although
Chamberlain probably knew 2 of it and consequently,
was guilty of the sin of "omission if'not commission."3

1. Bryoe, James, Briton and Boer t pp. 35 if.
2. Garvin, !E.. ill,., III, '14 ff.

3. Carroll,

~.

£!l., p. 365.
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When news that the raid was started reached
Europe, Berlin instructed Count Hatzfeldt, the
German Ambassador at London, to inquire if the
British Government sanctioned the raid. l Marschall
laid down a flat principle that Germany would not
tolerate the annexation of Trsnsvaal. 2 He informed
the new British Ambassador, Lascelles, that in spite
of repeated warnings of the danger of incurring
German illwill in South Africa, England did not pay
the least bit of attention. 3 Salisbury and Hatzfeldt
informad Berlin via Lascellee that there was no
official endorsement of the raid.

Salisbury did

this even before its outcome was known.' Nevertheless,
a formal note of protest was sent from Berlin.

The

German Ambassador was instructed to ask for his passport if he received an impression that the raid was
authorized in London.

At the same time Germany

sounded out France to eee if she would cooperate
(temporarily) with Germany in stopping England.

The

purpose of this gesture was to make England again

1. Brandenburg,

.2R,.

cit., p. 83.

2. Tilley's Memorandum,

!.~.

, I, 326.

3. William II to Marschall, January 1, 1896,
G.P. , XI, No. 2514.

4. Seton-Watson, !.p..

~.,

p. 676.

4:1

realile the danger of isolation and the need of
joining the Triple Allianoe. l A request had been
made of Portugal for permission to send a detaohment of German troops to maroh through Portuguese
African

te~itory

to Pretoria, Transvaal for the

proteotion of German subjects.

This request was

denied by the portuguese minister, Marquis de Soveral.
Acoording to Eckardstain, Hatzfeldt's assistant at
London, thi s one ge sture did more th... anything a1 ••
to prevent an outbreak of war between England and
~rm8l17.2

A pa ••age of troops before England oould

have retrieved the situation, might have started a
juggernaut, whioh oould not be stopped even after
the primary oause, the raid, had been proven to be
independent of governmental sanotion.
News soon oame through that the raiders had
been oaptured and that the danger to Transvaal was
over for the time being.

Immediately the German

government sourried about to retrieve a situation
that could have been dangerous in spite of the failure of the raid.

A telegram was flashed to Hatzfeldt

to request the return of the note of protest.

1. Brandenburg, .2R.. oit., p. 83.
Court

2. Eokardete in , Baron von, Ten Years!!

2£ Saint Jame. 1895-1905, pp:-!4-S.

!a!

Luckily this was possible because Salisbury was
away and had not yet been able to open the note. l
It was return. d to the somewhat embarrassed Germans.
However, the sslvaging of this message was almost
wasted effort, for in the next few days Germany
performed one of the greatest diplomatic blunders
of the century when she sent the famous congratu.latory telegram to President Krueger.
The failure of the raid was in a sense a
disappointment for the Kaiser and his government.
If the raid had been suocessful and oould have been
attributed to England, Germany would have had some
oause for the establishment of a proteotorate over
the Transvaal.

This might have been one of the

reasons why Germany at this time approaohed her
erstwhile enemy, france, and also Russia t for
possible support.

She ooUld make temporary use of

her European rivals beoause of their indignation at
the raid.

However, the French aaw through this
easily enough. 2 Germany went so far as to offer
Krueger a proteotorate on January 2, 1896. 3 Dr.

1. Brandenburg,
2. Seton-Watson,

.2R,.
~.

olt., p.

ai.

oit., p. 578.

3. Lovell, ~. cit., p. 369. Lovell bases hie
statement on Konran-Lebman's aooount of a Memorandum
by Lieutenant Mesmer-Selden, one time German Military

Fredri ch ThilIlJle, one

0

f the e di tor 8 c f the Gro 88e

Politik in an article, "Die Xrugerdepsche,tt haa
stated that Transvaal had feared the establishment
of a German Proteotorate before the Jsmeson episode
made suoh an action possible or more desirable to
the Boers. l Wilhelm even offered Dr. Leyds. Boer
Representative-at-Large in Europe, military help
and added "if Lorenzo Marques (Portuguese Mozambique's
-

port of entry and chief source of Boer suppli.s) ever
ohanged owners. it oould only oome into German

O~

Boer handa .,,2
HoweTer. Salisbury's "oorrect attitude" hal
oheated Germany of any reasonable pretext for further
intervention at this time.!

Nevertheless, the Kaiser,

at least, felt that something must be done.

So on

January 3, 1896, a meeting was called in Berlin whioh
was attended by the Kaiser; Hohenlohe. the Imperial
Chanoellor; Marsohall, the Foreign Minister; and Dr.
Ittaohe at Constantinople. This Mimorandum Is quoted
in Chanoellor Hohenlohe's Memoirs. Lebm&ri'. article
anie Vorgesahichte der Krugerdepsche" appeared in
Archiv ~ Politik ~ _G~e_sc~h~i~c~h_t~et 1925.
1. Lovell,

~.

£li., p. 364.

2. Seton-Watson.

~. ~.t

p. 677.

3. Brandenburg • .2l?• .2.!i•• p. 84.

Kaiser, the Colonial seoretarr~l Likewise,
Seoretarr of state for the Navr Rollman, Commanding
Adm.irsJ. Knorr

t

and Chief of Naval Cabinet Benden

were present. 2 The Kaiser made some verr interesting, if not fantastic, suggestions which Marschall
explained in his disrr.
Janu8.rr 3rd. At 10 o'clook oonferenoe with
R.M. • •• R.M. unfolded somewhat astonishing
projeots. A protectorate OTer the Transvaal,
but I talked him out of that at once. Mobilization of the Marine Infantrr. The dispatoh of
troops to the Transvaal. And upon the Chancellor's objection: 'That would mean war with
England,'· R.M. replied, 'Yes, but onlr on
land.' Then it was resolved to send Soheele
(Colonel Baron von Sch.ele, Governor of German
East Africa until February 1895) to the Transvaal to reconnoitre. Also an unfortunate idea.
F1nallr R.M. at ~ suggestion sent a qongratulatorr dispatch to PreSident Krueger. 3
The telegram was finally sent then as the cabinet's
war out of a dilemma.

It was in Brandenburg's words

"a sort of lightning oonductor for the Kaiser's
energ7 ... ,

The final meS sage i tee If was drafte d by

Marsohall. but it was far from being hie own wish
and idea as the Kaiser later accused. Marschal1 6

1. :Brandenburg,
ll.!:.!•• pp.

68.

68-9.

4. Brandenburg,
5. HammsIDh!Ro-

oit., p. 84.

ill., p.

2. Hsmmall9,.2£3.

,2,E.

cit. ,
ill., p.

n·

p. 84.

67.
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was merely following a line of aotion whioh would
be the least of seTeral evils.

He was even obligated

to alter several worda in the original message
written by Herr Kaiser, the Colonial Seoretary, to
suit the Kaiser. l The words oongratulating Krueger
for

~preserving

the respeot for your government"

were ohanged to "preserving the independenoe of the
oountry against ~ttaok from outside."2

The full

message reads as follows:
I express to you mw sino ere oongratulationa
that you and your people, without appealing to
the aid of friendly powers, have sueoeeded, by
your own energetio aotion against the armed
bands Which invaded your country as disturbers
of the peace t in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence Of the country against
attaoks from without. 3
This was an improvement over suoh original fantastio
suggestions as having Germany deolare war on English
South Afrioa and remain at peaoe with England at the
same time or to get France to oooperate with Germany
in frightening England in a war overseas.
less, the message still oontained enough

Neverthe~ite

ohange the opinion of the English' publio toward

1. Carroll,

~.

2. Brandenburg,
I, 237.

oit., p. 369.
~.

£!i., p. 85.

3. Langer, W. L., Diplomacy

~

Imperialism,

to
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Germany to one of definite hostility.

The last

phrase of the message was a plain endorsement of
the Transvaal's claim to complete independence.
This was contrary to the London conTention of 18811
whioh recognized England's sovereignty over the
external affairs of the Dutch African Republics of
Transvaal and the Orange Free state.

The telegram,

a greater blunder than the raid ever was, threw a
shadow over Anglo-German relations which subsequently
grew dsrker. 2 Salisbury frankly told Eckardstein
that it was silly from the point-of-view of German
interests.!

The insanity of the situation was

realized all too well by Hatzfeldt whO contemplated
reSigning as a result of the blunder and the
irreparable damage it had done to British-German
relations.' His only reason for staying on waa to
"make gOOd as far as possible the harm done. w5
The Jameson Raid and the M'rican 8i tuation
in general were indications to some Englishmen that

t.
2.

ill., p. 362.
Seton-Watson, ~. £!i., p.
Carroil,

~.

3. Eckardstein,

-

~.

4. Ibid. , p. 87.

-

6. Ibid. t p. 87.

ill· , p.

6'18.
85.

England was in need of an ally.

Among these was

Joeeph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in Salisbury's seoond oabinet.

Chamberlain was oonvinoed

that "Splendid Isolation" was a bankrupt polioy.l
England had hardly a single friend.
to be done quiokly.

Something had

She desperately needed allies

who would work for peace.

Chamberlain and Arthur

Balfour, aoting as Prime Minister in his unol.,
Lord Salisbury's, absence, oonsidered that, despite
the numerous Anglo-German differenoes, Germany would
be the most logioal oandidate for possible partnership in a defensive allianoe 2 sinoe most of the
differenoes between the two oountries were stlll in
the stage of annoyanoes.

Chamberlain was oonvinoed

that an ally was absolutely necessary.

He did not

believe that an alliance with even Russia and Franoe
was impossible. 5 However, he was moreoonvinoed that
England's differenoes with Germany, partioularly
oolonial, were not nearly as divergent as with other
powers.

Consequently, Chamberlain began to make in-

quiries as to the possibility of some kind of allianoe

1. Garvin,

~.

oit., III, 254.

2. Brandenburg, !.R.. ill.., p. 106.
3. Garvin, !R. !!l., III, 255.

wi~b

England.

But, his negotiations were not

officially those of the cabinet. Henoe, they were
regarded as a private matter. l Through the intermediary of Baron Eckardstein, the German Ambassador'.
Assistant in London and an old acquaintance ot
Chamberlain's, a meeting with Hatzfeldt. the Ambassador, was arranged. 2 The meeting ooourred March 29,
1889.

At this time it was unoffioially proposed that

England might not only reaoh an understanding but
even oonclude a defensive allianoe with Germany.3
This is substantiated by Hatzfeldt.'
Here Gel"Dl&IlY at last had in her handS what
Bismarck had desired and What he had striven for

80

hard in the last years of his ministry--an alliance
with England. 5 On the surface at least this was what
Germany wanted or thought she wanted in 189&.6

1. BritiSh D8cumentB, Vol. I, Foreword. Also
Chamberlain'. Memorandum, larch 29, 1898, Garvin,
~. ~.,

III, 259-60.

2. Garvin,
3.

March 29,

{bil.'
8,.

~.

£!i., pp. 255-256.

p. 260.

Chamberlain's Memorandum of

--

4. Hatzfeldt to Bulow, G.P., XIV, pt. It
196-199.
5. Ha.u:unanv.,.!Ut.

ill.,

6. Supra, pp. 3'-38.

PP. 24 ff.
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However, now that she had the possibility of
securing what she wanted, she let it go beoause
she thought she oould get even better terms in
view of England's predioament.

She was skeptical,

with some justifioation, for just a few months
before a similar proposal bad been made to the
Tsar. 1 Then, too, the favored Navy program of the
Kaiser was now beginning to displace IIlaIlY of the
older ideas and polioies.

Another distraoting

factor was the unoffioial nature of the proposals
from a responsible oabinet.

Bulow, the German

Minister of State, said that he oould not trust the
unoertainty and unreliability of England's parliamentary government. 2 Likewise, Bulow objeoted to
suoh an arrangement on the grounds if suoh a treaty
were made by Germany I1we must oome to the assistanoe
of England Whenever she was attaoked in India or
Canada or in 80me other of her numerous colonies and
overseas possessions, while England remained with
grounded arms if Russians marched against Austria or
the Frenoh against Italy.n3 Strangely enough, the

-2. Bulow, Prinoe Bernhard, Memoirs, I, 380.

1. G.P. XIV 243.
t

t

3. Ibid., p. 379.
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Kaiser, too, was instrumental in oreating the deadlook.

The British overtures were, he told the Tsar

"by my oommands oooly and dilatorily answered in a
colourless manner."l
Salisbury, the Prime Minister, upon his return
from France, where he had been resting beoause of his
health, was probably happy that Chamberlain's suggestions had not been more productive.

He later told

HatBfeldt that while he agreed with Chamberlain in
abstract in desiring a rapprochement with Germany, he
did not favor a formal alliance or treaty neoessary
until a speoifio oase of neoessi ty arose. 2 _Salisbury
had not yet been oonvinoed that "splendid isolation"
should be given up.

He was in truth the "residuary

legatee of the system of Castlereagh.,,3
"ice had been broken."

However, the

Both powers seemed to agree

• • • that the most important task of both governments was gradually to dispel the ill-humour still
prevailing between the two oountries, by showing
a spirit of aooommodation in minor questions, and
thus to prepare publio opinion on both sides for
a definite political agreement. 4

1. Nicholson,

2l?,-

cit., p. 9.4.

2. HammaJ1l.,.2,£. oit-, p. 79.

3. Ceoil, Algernon, British Foreign Seoretaries,
"Salisbury," p_ 30t.
4. Hamman", !E..

ill., p •

79 •
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Chamberlain as late as June 2, was still reported
by Hatzfeldt as desiring "to work by leisurely but
friendly efforts for an alliance with Germany and
so to act that the way was left open for any understanding later on.nl

Salisbury's unrelenting

reluctance to entertain seriously talk of a complete
alliance with Germany was based on his suspicion
that

Ger~

dangled the prospect of such an alliance

before England just enough to keep her interested in
times of difficulty.

Germany did this merely t.

wrangle oolonial concessions from England and Dot tc
realize the purported purpose--a permanent understanding resulting from an alliance. 2
The German Ambassador continued to disouss
the question academically with Salisbury with the hope
that something oould be gained for Germany in the
future. 3 It so ha.ppened that the "future" was just
a little over a month away and the "something that
oould be gained" was the Portuguese colonies.
Thus by June 1898 the English Government had
oome to a partial realization of its adverse situation

240.

1. Ratzfeldt Report of June 2 and 3,

-

2. Brandenburg, 2R.. oi t., p. 145.

-

3. Ibid.

t

p. 114.

G.P. XIV,
--

62

of "splendid isolation."

England was in danger of

being without friends at a time when her own oolonial
problems were becoming acute in South Africa.

To

forestall any embarrassment in the growing diffioulties, England indicated that she would posSibly bow
to ciroumstances and seek aid Bmong her rivals·and
potential enemies; at the time Germany was the most
logical one from whom to secure such aid.

CHAPTER III

STEPS TOWARD AN ANGLO-GERMAN
COLONIAL AGREEMENT

CHAPTER III
STEPS TOWARD AN ANGLO-GERMAN
COLONIAL AGREEMENT
Chamberlain's initial efforts to establish a
regular allianoe between GermaDJ and England proved
unsuocessful beoause of German distrust of England,
German indeoision as to whether she should turn more
to Rus sia or Engl and for added supportl and the unenthusiastio attitude of the Salisbury element in
the British Cabinet.

Nevertheless, both pawers left

the baok door open.!

Germany indioated that While a

large soale understanding was impossible, there was
still a possibility for a settlement of speoific
minor matters. 3 This apparently oonformed to Salisbury's views as expressed to Baron Staal. Russian
ambassador, when he was inquiring as to the rumored
possibility of an Anglo-German alliance.

At this

time the BritiSh Prime M1nister replied, "Allianoe
(with Germany) non; rapproohement oui."' Consequently.

1.

Bran4enbur g, .2:e..

0

it •• pp. 113 ff.

2. SUpra, Ch. II, pp. 6l-62.
3. Bulow to Hatlfeldt, June 8, 1898,

No. 251.

4.

Hamma.n~) .2R..

ill·.

p. 80.

g,.F.. XIV.
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the stage was well set in 189B for speoific negotiations for the eventual disposal of Portuguese
colonial possessions, particularly in Africa where
there was such a duplioation of German and English
interests.

Aooording to Hamman, Germany realized

that the proximity of Portuguese possessions in
Africa to Transvaal, German East Africa, German
South West Africa and the BritiSh South African
possessions provided ample opportunity for embarrassing oomplications.

The Reich soon conceived the idea

of avoiding hostile complioations by means of an
Anglo-German agre~ment ooncerning Afrioa. l fhis,
however, plaoed

Germa~

on the horns of a dilemma--

how was she to oome to en agreement With England in
Africa and yet not give up rights and possessions
of her own?

EVidently, a catalyst, lightning

conductor, or scape-goat was needed.
The embarrassing condi tion of Portugue se
finances by May, 189B, plus the growing strategio
importanoe of the location of her colonies were coinoidentally opportune for the diplomatic
England and GerInaDy.

~arring

of

By May of 189'8 Portugal was in

1. Hamman,,!E.. oit. t p.

so.
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desperate nee d for money to meet not only the forthcoming award of arbitration against her as a re8Ult
of her oonfiscat1onl of British ra1lroad interests
in Mozambique (East Africa), but even her ordinarJ

debt engagement s, on whioh the payment of interest
had been suspended.!
So desperate was this need that the Portuguese government sent its Governor-General of
Mozambique, Major Moushino de Albuquerque to Paris,
L.ondon and Berlin to make soundings as to the di8position of these various governments.

Portugal,

at this time. :!!!..!!!!!. offer1ng !!!.!: colonies in
Afr10a -for _
sale
for a- ----loan. 8 This
--.......... or -as -e collateral -----.

v1sit by MOushino proved a revelation to him of the
mili tart sm that pervaded Germany.

He, as governor

of MOzambique, the nearest non-British neighbor of
the German favori te, Transvaal, saw danger to hi8
country from Germany.

So "he determined that hi.

country should maintain the best possible relations
w1th Germany and the Transvaal compat1ble with a

1. Ir. Bertie i s Memorandum on England and
Portugal in Africa, May 1. 1898, B.D. It No. 65.

--

2.

Hamman~,~. ~••

3. Ibid., p. 82.

p. 82.
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cl08e understanding with England.- l

Consequently,

concurring with the Marquis d8 Soveral, longtime
Portuguese statesman and Ambassador to London in
1898, he thought that his government should adopt
a suggestion from England.

That 1s, that a loan

should be raised in England on the guarantee of
revenue. of the Portuguese colon1es, including
Lorenso Marques, "ooupl.' With a thorough understanding with Her-Majesty's government.-!
This gesture, more favorable to England than
the other powers, was in keeping w1 th Portugal' 8
allCient friendship with Eng land 3 and the Treaty of
preemption that she had signed wi th Por1lzgal in
1875, granting her prior rights to purohase Kozsmb1que if Portugal were disposed to 8e11 it.' However, it could p1que Germany, who because of the
proxim1 ty of Mozambique to German East Africa 811d
the Boer Republic, believed it to be in her sphere
of innuence by the r1ght of justioe if not by law.
In fact,

alrea~

during the Jameson crisis, the

x. bertie's Memorandum on England
Portugal in Afrioa, !.!., I, 46.
2. Ibid., p. 46.
3. Supra, Ch. I.

".Supra, Ch. I, pp. 17-18.

and

•

5'1

Kaiser himself admitted that Germany was out to get
Lorenzo Marques, Mozambique's ohief port. l Chamberlain strongly suspeoted Germany of having deeigna
on this locality as late as 1898. 2
Thus even before 1898, Germanyts newl, arouse!
colonial ambitions prompted her to take advantage of
Portugal's precarious pecUDiar,y situation.

She

Showed herself extremely interestea. to furnish credit
guaranteed by the oustoms ot Angola, llozambique, ana.
Timor.!

The Portuguese colonies were not only tempt-

ing prizes, but were also exasperating inconveniences
to German Afrioan policy; the role Portugal played by
refusing transmit to German troops during the JamesoXl
orisis was proof.
The German government lost no time in bringing
pressure to bear on England.

Although the German

Empire had Shown an interest in the Portuguese
coloniea as early as the Jameson situation, it was
partioularly anxious to secure oonoessions in Portuguese Africa after the Moushino mission gave glaring

1. Hammen" / .9.P.. e 1t., pp. 70-71.
2. Count Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Offioe,
June 14, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., German Dijfomatio Doo~
menta 18'10-1914, p. 21; Also .f!.l.., XIV, 2 .•
3. Guedes, Armando Marques, Alianca Ingle.s,
p. Z25.
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indication of Portuguese finanoes.

On June 3, 1898,

the Kaiser indicated, on marginal nete. on the report
of Hatzfeldt (the German Ambassador to London) to the
Foreign Office, that Ger.man colonial interests
demanded oonsideration of the aoquisition of
Portugal's African possessions. l

80me o~

Therefore, on June 6, 1898 when Count Tattenbaoh, German :Minister to Lisbon, learned that the
Marquis Luis de Soveral had been sent to England with
specific instructions to obtain money by mortgaging
the revenues (not the sovereignty) of Mozambique,
Angola and other Portugue se colonies, he telegraphed
Berlin at once.!

This information soon produced

aotion, for on June 14, 1898, Hatzfeldt oalled on
Salisbury and made some roundabout inquiries as to
what Sovaral was proposing. 3

Salisbury was evasive.

However, he indioated that the problem had bee. referred by

h~

Chamberlain.

to the Colonial Seoretary, Joseph
He promised Hatzfeldt that be would

1. DUgdale, I.T.S., ~. cit., Bernhard TOB
Bulow in Berlin to Count HatZfeTri, June 8, 1898, III,
21-28. Also G.!. XIV, 261.
2. Ibid., p. 27, editorial note.

3. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, June 14, 1898,
!.~.,

I. 48.

I'

inform Germany in due time if steps were undertaken
in referenoe to the Portuguese colonies which would
ooncern the legitimate rights and interests of
Gerlll8ll7.

Salisbury was comple tely aware of German

sensitiveness in African matiers. l

He had learned

that too well during the Jameson Raid crisis.

He

was eager to keep Germany placated.
According to hie own report of the conversation,
Hatzfeldt said he
• • • explained in friendly. but emphatic terms
that one-sided action 1n the matter here lnvolT1ns
actual or contemplated passing of Portugal' 8
sovereign rights in those oolonies into Br1ti&h
hand s wo uld make a very bad 1m.pres 8i on Wi th us
and also would not tend to ~prov. our relations
whioh we both deaired. and that the question was a
politioal one, whioh he, Sali.b~, and not
Chamberlain would have to decide.~
T.he gauntlet was

def~nitely

down.

However, Bulow must

haTe believed that there was a strong possibility of
being able to persuade or foree England to enter into
a joint negotiation, beoause when the French ambassador
asked if he (Bulow) had any information on a pOSSible
Anglo-Portuguese negotiation~ he replied in a depreciating tone. 3 Nevertheless, he wae careful to inolude

1. Brandenburg t

.2P.,.

cIt ... p. 11i.

2. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 14, 189&.
Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. ~... III, 29; aleo ~.!. XIV, No.261.
3. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 1', 1898, Dug4al.,
B.T.S.,.2.2.• .£ll.... III, 50; Also G.l. XIV, 261h
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in informatiou telegraphed to Hatzfeldt. the
suggestion that if England knew that Pranoe waa
interested, she (England) would negotiate muoh more
readily with Germany.

~he

next meeting between

Salisbury and Hatzfeldt brought out more specifio
comments.

Hatzfeldt asked if England would join

wi th Germany in a

CODUOOn

aotion on the financial

negotiations Portugal was requesting.

Salisbury

said the Government
• • • considered any financial dealiDg betwefln
us and Portugal a matter whioh exolu8iTely OOBoerned the two powers in question • • • I di4
not think • • • that the,.
negotiations
ooUld
form the subjeot of diplomatio oommunioation
between Her Majesty's Government and the German
government .1
__
SUoh an attitude. if allowed to oontinue.
would soon make it possible for England to present a
fait aooompli before Germany could even get a chanoe
to present her oa88.

Consequently, von Bulow

immediately telegraphed Hatzfeldt an outline of
Germany's position in the affair.

The sum and sub-

stanoe of this message was that willy-nilly Germany
was going to get something out of the Portuguese
situation.

Bulow veiled his materialistio outlook

very thinly when he wrote,

1.

Marquess of Salisbury to viscount Gough.
June 21, 189S, B.D., I, no. 67.

--

------------------

----,---"-

-

----,-"
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For us as well as for Ellgl811d in this matter
as in all oolonial matters in general, it is
an affair not 80 muoh of provable rights, but
of interests and the power available for
establishing these interests, if need be. l
His arguments went on to prove that although Germ8ll7
laoked the assurance of naval strength that England
had to assure her of independent action, ahe controlled the European balance in such a way that should
make things extremely embarrassing for England if
that oountry refused to allow Germany to push her way
into the negotiations.

Then, too. he in41cate' that

GermaDi should be given some reciprooity for the
support ahe had given to England t s ES'1Ptian polio,..
In faot. if Germany di4 not get muoh reCiprocity, ahe
might be made to appear the fool and the Government
would 108e prestige both at home and abroad.

In this

event Germany would be forced to sct with energy.

So

it would be obe aper for England to come along quiet11
and agree from the first. I: Bulow was anxious to
oo~t

England as quiokly aa pOSSible, for although

Portugal had refused England's oonditions for the loan
on June 20th, he felt that the finanoial condition of

1. Bilow in Gerlin to Ratzfeldt, June 22. 1898,
Dugdale, E.T.S., !!. oit., III, 32; also i.!., XIV, 278.
2. ]Ulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898,
2'12.

~.~.,

XIV,

6!
the Portuguese government would soon force it to
capitulate. l He did not wan~ this to happen before
Germany could get an opportunity to participate in
the negotiations.

!ben too, he was anxious becauae

he felt that France was eager to gain something at
this time from the Portuguese situation.

In faot

Bulow's anxiety over possible French interference extended until August, the last month of negotiations.!
In spite of the German attitude--if not intimi-

dation--and in spite of a desire to consider German
sensitiveness, salisbury was fundamentally concerned
tha t the Portuguese Empire should not break up if
anything could be done to save it. 3 In fact, thi8 was

1_

Ealow to Hatzfe1dt, June 22, 1S9S,

G.t-

tIf,

2. Baron von Richthofen to Count Hatzfeldt,
August 12, 189S, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. Cit., III, 3'.
3. Dugdale, Blanche, Arthur James Balfour, I,
266-7. This fear of Jrance 1s somewhit &mns1ng; Von
Bulow himself created the 8ituation. At the same time
that Germany was sounding out England ill early June
for the possibility of joint action on the Portuguese
colonial question, Von Bulow was sounding out France
to 8ee if she woUld act Jointly with Germany on the
same question. Von Bulow to Count Minister in Paris.
June 18th, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~_ Cit., 111,30-31.
This was to be a type of hedging in oa'S8Eilgland would
not cooperate. Hanotaux, Foreign Minister in the
Meline Ministry appeared to be interested. However,
before anything conorete was accomplished the Meline
Ministry resigned. It was succeeded by the Brisson
Cabinet in which Delcasse was Foreign Minister. Deloasse definitely did not approve of anything resembling
Franco-German collaboration. The "danger" of French
"interference" cea.ed.
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Salisbury's attitude throughout the Portuguese conversations and negotiations; while Germany was
interested in securing spoil, he was chiefly
interested in not antagonizing Germany and yet not
offending Portuguese susceptibilities. l Brandenburg,
expreesiDg somewhat the German viewpoint, concede.
that England had no desire to hasten the dissolution
of the Portuguese Empire. 2 Hamman i8 of a similar
view. 3 Von Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt's assistant in
London at the time of the negotiations, believes that
the whole situation was hypothetioal. 4 Bulow on the
other hand gives indioation throughout his aocount of
the negotiations that he was strictly interested in
what he could get out of the situation in a material
way.5 Portugal's susceptibilities and the possibility
of conoluding a lasting understanding with England
were not oonsidered.

He probably oonsidered bucoanneering the oolonies from the very first. 6 Ironically

1. DUgdale, Blanche kthur
t

:Tames Es!!our,

26'.

2. Brandenburg, !E.- .2..li., p. 117.

.ill., p. 83.
4. Eokardstein, ,2;2• .ill., p.
3_ Hamman",,2,E.•

5. Bu.low t ,2E..

~.

t

182.

I, 320 ff.

6. GarVin, .2:£e ill,., III, 321.

It
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enough the German Government through Bulow maintained a polioy that was moat suooinotly expressed
by Salisbury in a speeoh in Albert Hall, May 4, 1898.
He said then,

You may roughly divide the nations of the world
as the living and dying .. • • the weak state.
are becoming weaker, the strong states are beooming stronger • • • the living will gradual17
encroaoh on the territory of the dying • • • 1
Germany. with her colonial appetite brought into full
spate by the Weltpolitik

philosop~,

was evident17

resolved to have her share of the world even if sh.
had to take it from the dying and give them ali ttl.
help in the

pro~ess

of dying.

Portugal was made all too cognizant of her
predioament, not only b.J the Bnstere paternalism of
England, but also by the blunt diplomaoy of Germany.
On June 22, 1898 the British Government was informed
by Soveral that the Kaiser had sent the King of
Portugal 8uoh an urgent message that the King had to
rush baok to Lisbon and grant an audienoe to the
German Minister (Tattenbaoh}.2

Tattenbaoh 8aid that

the Kaiser could not continue on amioable terms With
Portugal if the negotiations for a loan from England

1. Garvin. 1£. olt., III, 281.
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, June 22,
1898, B.D., I. No. 68.

--
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were oontinued without due regard to the legitimate
interests of Germany.

At this time the Portuguese

Government was still anxiously trying to get the best
deal it could from England without unduly offending
Germany and Franoe. l
The Portuguese government asked England what
to do in reference to the German pressure.

England

informed Portugal that it depended on how badly ahe
wanted the money.

However, insofar as the intimida-

tion was conoerned, Salisbury 8sid that Germany had
no right to interfere with the negotiations that were
being discussed between Portugal and England.

In

reply to the Portuguese inquiry at this time as to
what was England's attitude toward the "Ancient
treaties,"

England replied the. t it was the same as

that expressed in Lord Granville's note to the British
Ambassador in reference to a similar request in 1875. 2
It should be observed, however, that the 1873 note
made no mention of colonial territory.

On the whole,

the English attitude in the reply to Soveral's
inquiries aeemed slightly
!he next

0001.

day SaliB~u.ry

1. Salisbury to sir.
1698, B.D., It No. 71.

--

H. VaoDOnel1, June 29,

2. Supra, Ch. I, p. 16.

-

seemed to be a little
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more reoeptive toward German suggestions for a
joint loan based on colonial revenues and on ultimate possibility of assuring sovereignty of allotted
colonies if the Pcrtugue se should default on the ••
loans. 1 Soveral approaohed Salisbury again on the
twenty-ninth with a suggestion that 8.000,000 pounds
be lent to Portugal, 2.000,000 of whioh would b•
• eoured by revenne. from MOzambique; 6.000,000 of
which would be seoured by customs from Portugal itself.

Salisbury intimated "that the advantages to
us did not appear to be very great ... 2 There was a
definite attitude

o~

reservation here.

By June 30th, Mr. Bertie, A.8sistant Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs t had prepared an official memorandum based "on the assumption that Her
Majesty's Government are disposed to admit the
participation of Germany. but to «xclude that of
France in the arrangements for the relief of Portugal
from her present embarrassments • • • • n

He conoluded

his c01DIlBnts with the ominous promise, stating:
If for political reasons it is necessary to
oome to terms with "Germny we might have wi th her

1. SaliSbUry to Vi8count Gough,
Ho. '11.

I.A.,

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell,

I, No. 70.

!.~.,

I,

an exchange of secret notes undertaking that
whenever, if ever t the 'break-up of Portugal
from internal oauses should oome about GermaDJ
shall reoeiTe oertain specified portions of
the spoil. l
This was the essence of the entire agreement oonoluded in August.
On July 6, aooording to Hatzfeldt, Salisbury
himself began disoussion on the Portuguese question
and as sured him "thB. t he Was by no means refusing to
oome to an understanding with us on it."2
no reoord of this oonversation in the

There is

_Br_i_t_i_sh_~-

menta.

In faot. there is no reoord in any of the
Foreign Office Arohives. 3 By July 9, Salisbury was
disoussing speoifios With Hatzfeldt.

With no violent

objections he listened to Hatzfeldt1s suggestions of
probable lines of division and distribution of shares
of the Portuguese Afrioan Empire.

He said, "I told

Count Hatzfeldt I would plaoe the negotiations before
~ oolleagues on TUesda7."4

!.~

..

However, he still

1. Memorandum by Ir. Bertie, June SO, lS98,
I, No. 72.

2. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, July 6,
1898 (cipher telegram), !!.l., XIV, 281.

--

3. Editor's Note, B.D., I, 55.
4. Salisbury to Visoount Gough, July 9, 1898,
1}.•.:Q., I, No. 74.
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impressed upon Hatzfeldt that he oould not, for fear
of Frenoh mischief-making, consent to an agreement
which would have the effeot of wounding the feelings
of the Portuguese, and giving them the impression
that the English were watching for the downfall of
Portugal.

In the same statement in whioh he said that

he would present the metter officially to his cabinet
he still voiced his reluctance to sell an old friend
into bondage.

He said, "The difficulty will be a form

of note which would not look like cutting up Portugal
while atill alive."l However, he was now speaking of
a note a8 a foregone oonclusion.
The die was cast.

An

agreement was ul time. tel,.

to be made by two external parties--Germany and
Britain--for the possible ultimate division between
them of a third party's insecure colonial possessions,
the Portuguese colOnies.

Based on surface indications

such an arrangement could best be described by Sir
Arthur Nicholson, First Lord Carnock's statement.
desoribed it as "the most cynical business in
experience of diplomaoy."2

!.~.t

~

He
whole

Already by July 6, 1898

1. salisbury to viscount Gough, JUly 9, 1898,

I, No. 74.

2. Nioholson,

~. ~.,

p. 285.
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England had, aooording to surface indications, left
oonsiderations of Portugal aside.

No reply was mad.

to Portugal's final capitulation to Salisbury's terms
for a loan. 1 These terms would have given England-independent of German collaboration--a voice in the
administration of Delagoa Bay.
By July 1898, then, Great Britain despite her

anoient friendship for Portugal and despite qualms of
consoience was ready to make a deal to share in the
eventual spoils of her deoadent friend's Empire.

Eng-

land, to be sure, was not entirely to blame, beoause
Portugal made the first overture earlier in the year
to raise a lOaD, secured, if there was no other
recourse, by the colonial revenues or possible sale.
Nevertheless, Portugal did not intend to sacrifioe
sovereignty over the oolonies as the contemplated
Anglo-German deal oontemplated at this time. 2

Neither

did England initiate the joint German-English negotiation.

Why

then, notwithstanding Salisbury's qualms,

did England finally agree to negotiate?

This question

oan not be fully answered at this state of disoussion,
1. Sir lie MacDone1! to the Marquess of salisbur.y, July O. 1898, !.~., It No. 73.
!.~.,

2. Salisbur,r to Sir H. MaoDonell, June 28, 1898,
I, No. 68.
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but the fundamental difference between the German
and English viewpoint must be noted.

Germany was

considering an immediate dissolution of Portugal.
England was hoping for her to continue as long as
possible as she was.

As long as Portugal stood--

weak or strong--what Germany planned could not occur.
England probably was using an uncertain possibility
of an eventuality

8S

a basis of negotiation with

Germany to hold Germany in check.

Germany considered

that such a possibility could be made quite kinetic
by a willful Germany acting in conJunction with
England.

England maintained an attitude of reluct-

ance and hesi tanoy.

Germany maintained an attitude

of opportunism and action.

Then. too, it should be

noted that as late as July 13, Salisbury seemed to
think that Portugal would be a member of the negotiations. l As the negotiations developed he saw that
Portugal was to be excluded.

This fact probably con-

tributed to his dislike of the whole arrangement.
which he more or less tried to side-step.
From the evidence already displayed it oan

1.' Salisbury to Viscount Gough, JUly 13, 1898,
B.D •• I, No. 75.

--
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be said then that England finally agreed to suoh a
paradoxical arrangement for political reasons, but
she was always anxious that such an arrangement
should not appear to be "cutting up Portugal while
still alive."

CHAPTER IV

THE ANGLO-GERMAN TREATY OF 1898

CHAPTER IV

THE ANGLO-GERMAN TREATY

O~

1898

The colonial understanding only tentativelY
discussed before July 1898. now (July 1898) began to
be more definite.

Aotive negotiations took the place

of suggestions and hints.

Once England agreed to

consider a settlement. the negotiations became merely
protracted bargaining over who should eventually get
what share of the Portuguese oolonies.

The outcom.

of this bargaining had two distinctly different
aspeots.

On paper it would seem that GerIIlBll7 secured

the ftlion1s share."

Aotually England won a brilliant

diplomatic viotory at a time when such a victory was
politically and militarily prioeless.
~ermany

first demanded all of Angola (Portu-

gue •• W.st Africa) and all of Mozambique north of the
Zambezi River and east of the Shire River.

This in-

cluded part of what was already English terri tory,
Blantyre.

In addition to this Germany desired the

Portuguese island of Timor in the Orient.
Salisbury was sure that the Kaiser was "bent
on an agreement

~

some

~;

but that, nevertheless,

he was taking the opportunity to make larger demands
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than he was prepared to press. nl As long as
Salisbury took part in the negotiations he maintained, in addition to his concern about "cutting
up Portugal alive," an unrelenting campaign to
deflate the German demands to 8S low a point 8.
possible.

In fact, the Kaiser became so exasperated

8t Salisbury's attitude that he had his mother write
her mother, Queen Victoria, informing her that her
Prime Minister was an obstacle to the understanding
between England and Germany.2
When Hatzfeldt returned to the Foreign Office
on July 13 to Bee how his proposals of the ninth had
been accepted by Salisbury's oolleagues, he found
that a definite decision to oonsider negotiations
had been msde. 3 However, the terms that Salisbury
placed before Hatzfeldt left him ill-satisfied.

At

this stage of the negotiations Salisbury still
assumed that Portugal would have a voioe in the
decisions.

To all appearances he was going On the

assumption that Portugal still wanted money badly

1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, JUly 9, 1e9S,
B.B,. , II, No. 74.
2. Langer, !l2.. ·cit., II, 527.

Ja.£.

3. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 13, 1898,

t

I, No. 75.

enough to be agreeable to a jOint loan instead of
one to England slone.

England' e counter proposals

gave Germany substantially what she wanted in
Mozambiqui. but only that portion of Angola south
of the town of Egito. l
~

9.ua

~

England also wanted as a

that Germany agree to Portugal's

abandoning to England the railroad from LorenBo
Marques as well as the Port itself.

Salisbury still

insisted that Portugal and her colonies should be
maintained as long as possible and that no surrender
of sovereignty be involved in the loans.

Re suggested

that preemptive rights be granted over those sections
used as collateral respectively for Germany and England.

These preemptive rights were to go into effect

only if mischance overtook Portugal to such an extent
that she would be forced of her own accord to surrender
her colonies.

Late on the same afternoon that Salis-

bury informed Hatsfeldt that England was agreeable to
a joint loan along the lines just described, the
Portuguese Minister Marquis de Soveral called on
Salisbury and delivered the following message: " • • • in
view of all the difficulties with which the question of

1.

See map, Appendix

F.
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a loan was surrounded, his Government had decided
in favour of leaving matters !a statu quo_"l
According to Salisbury, Soveral explained that this
decision involved the abandonment of all idea of a
loan from the British or any other Government and
also of any notion of altering the attitude of Great
Britain or of Portugal towards any portion of the
Portuguese possessions in Africa.
This point-blank statement put a decidedly
different interpretation on any further negotiation
that might be oarried on, for now the negotiations
would not inolude partioipation of the subjeot of
the negotiations, Portugal.

Portugal's refusal "to

come along" was extremely embarraSSing because her
precarious finances might even have initiated an
international COmmiSSion of debt administration,
which, of oourse, would have preoluded any diplomatio
or oolonial schemes that either England or Garm8n7
might have.

Nevertheless, the negotiations continued

without the blessing of Eortugal's presence or
acquiesoence.

On July 19, 1898 Hatzfeldt again called

on Salisbury and expressed terms for an agreement

1898,

1. Salisbury to sir H. MacDoneli, JUly 13,
!.!_, I, No. 76.
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which were very similar to those of July 9; he
presented these in French in the tentative form of
a treaty.l

The next day Salisbury informed Ha~z

feldt that the cabinet had fully considered the
proposals and found that they were not entirely
acceptable. f

Above all things the British would

not give up certain territory of their own as well
as the Portuguese territory.

The Germans had pro-

posed to allow England to have the unrestricted
right to control Delage a Bay and the Transvaal Bay
in return for Blantyre (British territory), most of
Mozambique, Angola and l1alfi8ch Bay (British territory).

Salisbury explained that England already had

preemptive rights over Delagoa Bay,3 hence Germany
had no legal right to object before international
law if England were to acquire this area independent
of German cooperation.

The British Prime Minister

countered the German bid for British territory by a
demand by England for Togoland, if Walfisch Bay were
to be given up.

This upset the German Ambassador

1. SaliSbury to viscount Gough, Jilly 19, 1898,
No. 77.
I,
1!.E,. •
f. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 20, 1898,
B.D., I, No. 78.
3. SUEra, Ch. I, pp. 1'1-18.

'1'1

immensely.

He even threatened that Germany would

have to turn to Russia if England would not give
more concrete indications of a desire to become a
friend of

Germa~.

Apparently Salisbury as a "master

of public affairs" was trying to elude Hatzfeldt ae
long as possible by various evasions. l On the other
hand it was apparent that Germany considered herself
in an excellent position to drive a good bargain.
The negotiations continued for almost a month longer
with Germany

and

tremes.

tenor of the German negotiations in this

~he

England remaining at these two ex-

affair as d•• oribed in the subsequent memoirs of the
principle negotiations, is exceedingly mild in comparison to that expressed in the documents.

Von

Bulow's very general account of the episode would
make it seem to be merely a trial of British fidelity

which the treaty found to be laoking. 2

This viewpoint,

however, is very easy to arrive at years after all of
the events in the situation had taken the oourse
destiDJ had designed.

Eckardstein states that the
negotiations were very bypothetical. 3 However, at the

i. Guedes,
2. Bulow,

~.

cit., p. 327.

~. ~.,

III. 320-321.

3. Eckardstein • .2£. ill.., p. 18.2.

'18

time of negotiation it was evident that Germany was
thinking in terms of definite objectives whioh oould
be obtained beoause of the finanoial embarrassment
of Portugal and diplomatio embarrassment of England.
Between the twentieth of July and the twentyseventh, no official British records were made on the
negotiations.

Oa the twenty-seventh, the indomitable

Hatzfeldt again appeared at the Foreign Office to 8ee
if England was still Willing to oonolude a treaty

with Germany in referenoe to the Portuguese coloniee. l
Evidently when Berlin learned that the threat to
appeal to England's old

ene~,

RUSSia, did not make

Britain jump into Germany's arms, the Beich was
willing to make a few concessions.

Germany no longer

brought in the extraneous matter of ceSSion of BritiSh
territory contiguous to certain portuguese oolonial
areas allotted by

Germa~

to Germany.

The demands for

Blant,yre and Walfisch Bay were dropped as were
(temporarily) the demands for Timor.

However, in

return for this concession Germany wanted more territory in Angola and Mozambique which formd an enola'Ve
into British territory.

No. 79.

Salisbury immediately stated

1. Salisbury to sir

F.

Lasoe11es,
.

!.~.,

I,
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that this was not agreeable.

These views were

reiterated a week later when Hatzfeldt again reviewed
the conversations. l Salisbury repeated his objections
of July 27; whereupon Hatzfeldt suggested that in
return for giving up demands for the enclaved territory between the Zembezi and Shire Rivers, Germany
should receive more land in Angola.
oountered with objeotions.

Salisbury again

First, he objeoted to

the term "oompensation" used by Hatzfeldt in referenoe
to oonoessions Germany wanted in Portuguese Afrioa
from England in return to conoessions given to her.
Then he indioated that the added territory Germany
wanted in Angola would require that England at least
be granted extra-territorial rights there in oase of
an eventual Portuguese cession.
Salisbury still was anxious to consider the
suscepti bili tie s

0

f Portugal.

He still gave the im-

pression that Portugal should be consulted and
informed.

He stated that if the arrangement were

made between England and Germany "a great deal of
drafting would be neoessary in order to prevent suoh
stipulations from wounding the feelings or infringing

1. Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles,
No. 80.

!.~., It
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upon the rights of Portugal. Itl

He did not yet seem

to think a secret arrangement was necessary.
Hatzfeldt himself gave the best description
of the Prime Minister's reactions when he said ItI
realized that the Prime 1linister wishes at all oosta
not to appear at Lisbon in the light of an expectant
heir, dividing in advanoe the Portuguese heritage with
another. n2

Perhaps it was more than a coinoidenoe

that at this partioular point in the negotiations
Salisbury decided to take a rest at his Frenoh villa
at Dieppe.

After August 10 he had turned all of the

negotiations over to his nephew, Arthur Balfour,
whom he left in oharge of the Foreign Offioe. 3 Balfour
spent the next ten days in outting down the extraordinary German demands so that an agreement oould be
reaohed.'

It is quite possible that between July 20,

1898 when Salisbury was so cold to Hatzfeldt's

suggestion and August 3 when he appeared reoonoiled
to an agreement of some sort, part of his mixed

1. S8iisDury to sir

--

1898, B.D., I, No. 80.

~.

Lascelies, JUly 27,

2. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Offioe, August 8,
1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. ~., 111,36.
3. Dugdale, Blanohe,

-

4. Ibid., p. 267.

~. ~.,

111,.267.
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cabinet had indicated a desire to make a deal involving possible infringement of Portuguese sovereignty.
This he agreed to because of political reasons,
although he did not approve personally.

Then, too,

he never relished the idea of an alliance or agreement with Germany.

The Chamberlain element was

particularly desirous of an arrangement of friendship
with Germany.

This had, of cOUTse, been attempted

earlier in the year by Chamberlain without enthusiastic support from Salisbury--who oddly enough was
taking a short rest in France at that time too.
The French Foreign Offioe is responsible for
a similar interpretation, in reporting the situation
from the viewpoint of the Marquis de Soveral of
Portugal. l The Quai DIOrsay had the impression that
when Salisbury realized that Portugal would have to
pay the piper for the realization of an agreement of
sorts with Germany he "retired to his Villa at Dieppe
to avoid recrimination of the Marquis de Soveral--Afin
...........
d'evlter!!!

1!

recriminations~!

de Soveral,

!! Marquis

,

Salisbury ~ rendit ~ ~ villa ~ Dieppe. w2 This

1. MDeFleurian, Charge D'Affaires de Franoe
a Londres a M. POincare, Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres, Londres, 2 Avril 1912, Documents Diplomati~ues FrancaiS 1871-1914, 3 Serie 1911-1914. Tome
Second. 8 Fevrler, 10 Mal 1912, No. 291, p. 297.
2. Ibid., p. 297.
,

,,
f

I

.

82

document states that Salisbury had defended himself
but poorly when Soveral addressed observations of
righteous indignation to him.

There is nospecifio

record of such a conversation in the British Documents.

The Portuguese writer, Guedes, gives the

impression that Soveral might have spoken to Salisbury about the pending Anglo-German deal. l

However,

Guedes bases some of his information on the French
document s and consequently t cannot be relied upon as
a completely independent source--especially since
there was no official Portuguese documents published
on this entire episode. 2

1. Gue des ,2.£ •
t

Brandenburg gives the

.ili.,

pp. 327 fl.

2. In a letter sent to the writer of this
thesis on November 27, 1941. by Pedro don de Sousa
Pernes. Attache to the Portuguese Legation in WaShington. D. C. the following information on portuguese
material for this thesis was given:
"The Minister has asked me to thank you for
your letter of November 22nd, and to tell you that
there has been no official 'White Book' published
by the Portuguese Government on the subject of
'The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese
Colonies 1698-1914.'
If you read Portuguese you may find something
of interest in the book, nA Alianca Ingl.sa" by
Armando Marques Guedes, published in Lisbon, 1938,
pages 3~-27 • • • •
Other references of interest can be found in
Mr. Harold Nicholson's biography of his father,
Lord Carnock. In this book you will find quotations Which show the attitude of the British
Foreign Office in regard to this whole question. R

83

impression that Salisbury wanted to wash his hands
of the whole matter;l hence, the delegation of the
task to his nephew.

Then, too, Salisbury had evaded

Germany as much as possible.

When he finally saw

that Germany could not be put off any longer he may
have let someone else take the onus of responsibility
and have given assurances in the meantime to the protesting Soveral.

Later in 1911 the Ambassador to

Franoe, Sir Francis Bertie, wrote Sir Edward Grey the
following interpretation of Salisbury's absence:
(Bertie was Assistant Under Secretary of State in
1898. )
• • • the negotiations had been begun by Lord
Salisbury, who later on told Count Hatzfeldt, so
the latter informed me, that he would not have
signed the Agreement, to whioh the Ambassador
retorted, so he said to me, that he (Lord Salisbury) certainly would have signed it for the
Cabinet would have made him do so.
Lord Salisbury had no affection for the
Agreement, but that was, I think, partly because
he had hoped to stave off the German Government
and thought that his nephew had been too ready
to conclude the negotiations. Besides this, in
the latter days of Lord Salisbury'S time as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he and Arthur
Balfour were not always at one and the uncle was
rather jealous of the nephew in his marfagement
of the Foreign Office during the unole's absence. 2

1. Brandenburg,

~.

ill., p. 116.

2. Editorial note quoting a memorandum in Grey's
MBs., Vol. 54, January 25, 1911, !.~., X, Pt. 2, No.268.
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Bulow reports that Salisbury made a similar
exouse to Hatzfeldt somewhat atter the agreement had
been oonoluded. l
Nevertheless, the faot remains that soon after
Salisbu~'s

sidestepping of the issues, a treaty Was

oonoluded between Germany and England.

When Balfour

assumed oontrol, the Assistant Under-seoretary tor
Foreign Affairs, submitted a memorandum to him to
aoquaint him with the salient

B~itish

oonsiderations.

In this note he still implied that the British oon-

sent to negotiations was based on the hypothesis "that
the Portuguese Government will be willing to aooept
the oooperation of Germany With England in providing
money for Portugal, she giving in return reversionary
rights over Portuguese territories to Germany and
England."

This was the Salisbury standpoint.

The

Memorandum oontinued with some observations that might
explain Salisbury's previous evasiveness to Hatzfeldt:
There are no indioations that the cooperation
of Germany with England would be aoceptable to
Portugal. On the contrary, she is well aware of
the territorial and financial designs of Germany,
end it wUl only be very great pressure and dire
tinancial neoessity that will bring her to submit
to the intervention of Germany in her affairs.
M. de Soveral is strongly opposed to it, and urges
that we should not tie our hands with Germany as

1. Bulow,

~.

oit., I, 484.
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if we can postpone the question till the
autumn--when we may be 18SS occupied elsewhere-there i8 good prospeot of a change of government
at Lisbon and a satisfactory settlement between
England and Portugal. l
Here i8 at beat indirect evidence of the conversation
between Soveral and Salisbury referred to in the
French Document8. 2 This also explains much of England's conduct in the Anglo-German-portuguese matter
after the proposed agreement became an actuality.

It

possibly explains wby England hesitated and why the
treaty that was finally made did not go into effect.
Nevertheless, Balfour, having a specific situation
before him--an anxious Germany clamoring for an
agreement which some of the

B~itish

cabinet had long

hoped for in one for·m or another--proceeded with
negotiations in a most direct manner.

It would almost

Beem that he had this one particular task to do.

Per-

haps it had been delegated to him by his uncle specifically.

However, it would be hard to furnish a

satisfactory explanation of such a surmise.
events show some generalized reasons.

Subsequent

Evidently the

Bertie Memorandum and all of its cautions and doubts
did not deter Balfour.

~.Q.,

1. Memorandum by
I, No. 81.
2. Supra, p. 81.

The Memorandum seems to

Mr.

Bertie, August 10, 189B,

86

summarize the situation up to the point where a
decision was made to agree with Uermany, but doe.
not include reference to

8.

definite decision to

sign.
A1 though Ge rmany di d no t like to change
horses in mid-stream, ahe felt that there might be
some advantages.

Hatzfeldt presents the situation

as follows:
Al though the delay caused by handing over
further negotiations to Mr. Balfour is undesirabl.,
yet I think we must consent to it. The last time
he represented Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour waS
hon.at and forthcoming towards us; when we come
to discuss the matter with him it will probably
be soon evident whether a quicker conclUSion i.
to be expected in this way_ Lord Salisbury says
that Mr. Balfour will probably start disoussing
the matter by next Wednesda7.~
On August 11 the German Ambassador oalled upon Balfour
in reference to the Portuguese matter.

Balfour ex-

pressed a reluotanoa--similar to his unole's--about
dismembering Portugal before she was dead.!

ne pointed

out that England was willing to lend money to Portugal
only to keep her alive.

The colonial areas designated

as collateral were only to be deSignated as a provision
for the eventuality which the proposed treaty and loan

1. Count Hatztetdt to the German foreign OffIce,
August 8,1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. £!i., III, 36.
2. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 11.

--

1898, B.D., I, No. 82.

8'1

should seek to avoid.

However. provisions were

made on both side s as to the pro bable di spo si tion
between them of the Portuguese colonies, in oaee of
such eventualities.

Hatzfeldt handed Balfour a

memorandum as an unofficial communication.

It was

a slight amplification on the one he presented to
Salisbury on the Third of July.

On the eighteenth.

the German Ambassador had another interview with
Balfour.

Balfour informed Hatzfeldt that aocording

to his understanding with his uncle, Timor was not
to be inclUded in the proposed arrangement. l This
displeased Hatzfeldt who intimated that if Timor
were not inoluded, the negotiations would be broken
off, with resulting hard feelings in Germany.
At this same meeting the acting Prime Minister
presented the German Ambassador With.two memoranda which
were England's counter offer to Hatzfeldt's "Unoffioial
Memrandum" of the eleventh. 2 These Memorand.a summad
up what had been the previous British stand.

The first

memorandum stated that if money were to be loaned to
Portugal, it would be loaned Jointly by the two powers,
England possibly taking the largest loan.

These

1. Bilfour to Sir F. Lasoe11es, August 18, 1898,
~.~.,

I, NO. 83.

2. Ibid., Enolosures 1 and 2.
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prospective loans were to be secured by revenue
from Portuguese oolonies so distributed that Germany
would have the largest and England wha.t was the most
strategio.

This seourity would not entail a. sacrific.

of sovereignty.

These territorial distributions were

about the same as those which England had demanded up
to thi s da.te.
The second Memorandum (B) provided for the
action GerIIlSllY and England should take if the integrity
of Portuguese possessions could not be maintained.

The

two powers would take over the areas whioh they had
allotted to each other merely as loan seourity if
Portugal could not maintain her integrity.

England

was to get two small trading a.reas in the area of
Angola deSignated for Germany.

Nothing in the Declara-

tion was to detraot from any understanding already in
effect between Portugal and England.

England wanted

to retain the 'advantages of her alliance with Portugal
until the very moment Portugal would fall. Timor was
not mentioned in either Memoranda.

The next day the

Ambassador from Berlin informed Balfour that Timor was
an absolute "must" for ·the negotiations. l

By now the negotiations had proceeded to a
1. Balfour to sir F. Lasce11es, August 19. 189B,
B.D., It No. 85.

--
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point where England was making definite commitments.
The Portuguese government suspected as much.

In

fact, Hatzfeldt's frequent visits to the Foreign
Offioe were a cause of extreme anxiety to de Soveral.
He called on Balfour and stated that he feared these
frequent conferences boded no good to Portugal. l
Balfour told him that he was sure Portugal knew from
Salisbury of the deoision of England to aot in unison
with Germany.

Soveral replied to the oontrary.

His

understanding was that Great Britain would first oome
to an understanding with portugal and then possibly
invite Germany to ahare the loan and its collateral.
This was an embarrassing presentation of the
matter to England because at that partie-alar time
Portugal had made no

~

fide application for a loan.

In fact, she had withdrawn her application over a
month before, on July 13. 2 Balfour told the Portu,

gues. representative that eTen though there was no
ourrent application by Portugal, it would be for the
best of all ooncerned for

En~land

and Germany to come

to an agreement at once.

There were

t

he said, onl,..

three possible courses of action for Portugal.

!.12.,

1. Balfour to Mr. Thornton, August 18, 189S,
I, No. 84.

2. Supr$, Ch. IV, pp.

~4-75.
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The first was to borrow from Great Britain
alone, as he had apparently desired; the second
was to borrow from Grea t Brit ain and Germany
together. aooording to the proposal whioh I had
just sketohed out to him; and the third was to
endeavour to borrow from other Powers, Which
would probably only be done at the cost of an
international control, to which we should have
the strongest objection, and which would be
disastrous to the independenoe of his oountry.
If for any reason therefore the first of these
oourses seemed to us inexpedient, the seoond
was the one most advantageous to Portugal. I
told him frankly, therefore, that though I oould
not say whether our negotiations with Germany
would be succe8sful, I should endeavour to make
them so.l
This was putting the matter bluntly.
Soveral knew what was going on.

But at leas·t

Balfour did promise

to noommunicate wi th him again, if and when, anything
was 'finally arranged with Germany.n2
On the twentieth of July Balfour informed
Hatzfeldt that he and Bertie agreed that Timor could
be inclUded in the German share of the oollateral. 3
He also suggested that the treaty oould be swallowed
muoh more easily by Portugal if the interest rate on
the antioipated loan were kept very low.
Hatzfeldt seemed very happy.

B.E.,

On the whole

The agreement was about

1. Mr. B8ifour to t&. Thornton, August 18, 1898,

I, No. 84.

3. Mr.

2. Ibil., No. 64.

1898,

!.~.t

Balfour to Sir F.

I, No. 82.

Las~ellest

August 11,
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to be concluded.

He telegraphed the German Foreign

Offioe the following message:
Timor is settled, and I am convinoed that we
owe it to Mr. Balfour alone, for he urgently
desires a conclusion. I beg therefore that 88
few diffioulties as possible be made for him
regarding his draft, and that a seoret note in
explanation of the affair be agreed to in the
manner I recommended. l
In

conceding Timor, Balfour had to "battle down"

Chamberlain, who never wanted to see another power
improve its colonial position more than England
regardless of the circumstances. 2 When Balfour and
Hatzfeldt next conferred all seemed smoothly settled. 3
It was agreed that

Ger~

would be given some com-

pensation similar to Delagoa Bay if England should
ever exercise her preemptive rights there.

Germany

deemed this necessary to placate public opinion.
However, Balfour pointed out that the need for an
action requiring oompensation for Germany would only
oocur if Portugal" collapsed completely--beyond the
extent of help that a loan oould offer.
Although it was agreed to give Germany

1. Count Hatzfeldt to the German foreign Offioe,
August 20, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. gli., III, 38.
2. Dugdale, Blanche,
1898,

~. ~.,

III, 268 ff.

3. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 22,
I, No. 88.

~.D.,

--------------------------------~-----------------------~---
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preemptive rights over Timor, England declined a
German suggestion that England be given in return
the surrender of German extra-territorial rights in
Zanzibar.

This refusal was based on Balfour's desire

not to give the impression that England and Germany
contemplated and desired the eventuality of the proposed agreement, that is, the sharing of the spoils
of a fallen Portuguese Empire.

If England had agreed

to accept compensation for giving Germany eventual
preemption of Timor, it would have looked as if the
two powers "were more bent on dividing Portugal than
helping her with a loan.

Here again the difference

of the German and English opinion of the treaty oan
be observed.

England wanted to postpone the eventua-

lity; Germany wanted to hasten it.
A few more minor suggestions were made at this
conference by both parties.

All that remained to be

done now was to write up the final draft of the treaty.
This was done, and on August 28, Salisbury gave his
approval of the arrangement after the drafts had been
sent to him at Dieppe.

He said:

I am afraid the German negotiations must have
given you a great deal of trouble. If the Germans
take to being punctilious they are quite intolerable. The result seems to me quite satisfactory.l

1. Dugdale, Blanche,

»

~.

cit., fIt,

272.
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However, he still indioated his reluotanoe on
August 30, when he replied to Balfour's message
informing him that the agreement had been signed.
He said, "I only hope that it will not come into
use for a long time.-l
When the agreement had been signed the Kaiser
telegraphed Bulow the follOwing message, shoWing the
leit motif of the German viewpoint:
I am very glad of this turn whioh 1s all the
more important sinoe the peace and disarmament
proposals and all the ohatter about them add not
a little to the prospeots of war. I thank you,
dear Bulow, for your devoted and suooessful
labours, and for the ability with which you have
induoed Britain at last to give way to us. This
is one more great triumph of your diplomatio
adroitness and farSightedness.!

The agreement--offioially it was not a treaty
but. a "note"--wss signed jOintly in London, August 30,
1898, by Baifour and Hatzfeldt. 3

The agreement

provided that whenever it was deemed expedient by
both Germany and Britain to acoede to a request for
an advanoe of money, the loan was to be made simultan-

eously.

The amount to be assumed by eaoh would be

deoided at the time of lending.

1. DUgd81e, Blanche,
2. Bulow,

~. ~.,

~.

The territory was so

ait., III, 272.

It 321.

3. See Appendix A, Band C.
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divided that Germany would be allowed to take Timor,
all of Mozambique north of the Zambezi below its confluence with the Shire.

and

the greater part of

Angola; England would be allowed to take the remainder
of Mozambique and Angola. l If a foreclosure of the
proposed loan were necessary delegates would be sent
to Portugal to inspeot the revenues.

However, no

rights of administration were to be given to these
inspectors.

Administration of the revenues was to be

undertaken only if Portugal defaulted.
To all appearanoes this was a rather logical
agreement even if Portugal were not allowed a voioe
in its arrangement.

The agreement took cognizance of

portugal's sovereignty and ostensibly would not have
gone into effect unless Portugal requested a loan of
her own volition.

England did not hesitate to give

this part of the agreement wide publicity, a fact
whioh irritated Germany tremendously.2

Now the Reioh

oould not object to English aotion in South Afrioa.
However, what England did not publish was the
appended seoret agreement which provided for the exclusion of third parties from intervening in Portuguese

1. See map, Appendix F.
2. Bulow to Count Hatsfeldt, September 3, 1898,
Dugdale, E. T. s. t .2l1• .2!i.. III, 39.
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colonies included in the Anglo-German loan agreement, mutua). abstinence from any future claim to
those portions of the Portuguese empire allotted to
each as security, and assumption of complete control
by Germany and England of those parts of the Portuguese empire allotted to each if Portugal ever for
any reason renounced her sovereign rights. l
This section could be very dangerous to
Portugal's integrity.

In violation of the "ancient"

treaties, Portugal was never formally told about the
Anglo-German negotiation, notwithstanding Balfour's
promise of Augnat 18, 1898.

He merely informed.

Soveral of the first part of the treaty in whioh
there was no indication of a provision for the
possible loss of sovereignty by Portugal.
Lord Edward Grey stated in 1925:

~de

However,

Soveral kn.w

all about the seoret agreement with Germany 'and
made no seoret to Lord Salisbury of hia knowledge of
it.'"
again.

On September 2, 1898. Salisbury took over
His lack of enthusiasm for the agreement was

noted immediately in his hesitation and reluctanoe
to forae a loan on Portugal.
The Anglo-German agreement of 1898 was signed

1. Newton, K. P.
British Empire, p. 367.

t
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on August 31, 1898.

On September 1. 1898 Hatzfeldt

was alread7 at the Foreign Offioe attempting to impress on Balfour the possibility of the Portuguese
acoepting a Frenoh loan.

Hatzteldt regarded this as

extremely probable since Portugal was not apprised of
the secret olauses in the new oonvention which preoluded participation in a loan to Portugal by any
power other than England and Germ&n7.

He recommended

immediate activation of the purpose of the treaty.
Balfour recites the Hatzfeldt presentation of the
case as follows:
The German Ambassador called on me this afternoon in order to speak to me about a possible
complioation whioh might arise in oonneotion with
the reoent Anglo-~erman Agreements. He pointed
out the possibility of the Portuguese Government,
in ignorance of its exaot terms, going to France
rather than to the two Powers for the purpose of
obtaining 8. loan upon the security of the custome
in her African Colonies. Such a transaction
might be conoluded before we knew anything about
it; but inasmuoh as, under the Anglo-German
Agreements, the two oountries would be bound to
resist Frenoh intervention, by foroe if neoessary,
it was manifest that all four Powers might find
themselves unawares inVOlved in the gravest oomplications.
All this might be aVOided if it was known
beforehand--at all ~ents by the Portugue se Government.. ~tbat we could not admit the intervention in
the matter of a third Power and that we were prepared to give every facility ourselves to the
raising of the necessary loan. l

189S,

x.

!.~.
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t
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Hatzfeldt urged action by Germany and her

00-

signer, England, before October, the time when he
surmised tlJat the French loan might materialize.
Balfour promised to refer the matter to Salisbury
who was to resume control at the Foreign Offioe.

A

minute added by Salisbury to the above communioation
gives striking illustration of his personal views as
well as the future policy and attitude of England in
oonnection with this treaty.

Salisbury wrote:

I expected this. They are not oontent to
wait for events to give them their share of
Portuguese territory, but wish to foroe the paoe
of destiny. I do not think that it is possible
to make such an intimation to Portugal till we
know of the sort of finanoial terms Germany is
disposed to give. They will be of the Shylook
school.
There is no real danger to us--free right of
preemption protects the East Coast: and our
ownership of the hinterland proteots LQanda. l
On

September 9, 1898 Salisbury wrote Lasoelles that

he had instructed the Assistant Under.seoretary to

tell Hatzfeldt "that, in my opinion, M. de Soveral
being already aoquainted with the general purport of
the Anglo-German Agreement, it would be suffioient that
I

I should intimate to him that any loan from France
must not be seoured on the oustoms of Angola, and that

1. Mr. Baifour to Sir F. Lasoel1es, September 1,
1898,

~.~.,

I, No. 94, p. 76!
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warning I would oonvey to him."l

England oontinued

to give Germany such vague assuranoes.

Despite these

assurances, howeTer, Salisbury wrote the folloWing
letter to Sir R. MacDonell in Lisbon on November ,:
The Portuguese Minister oalled at this Offioe
on the 5th Instant and made, for my information,
a oommunioation respecting the loan for which the
portuguese Government are negotiating in Paris. • •

I have expressed to M. de Soveral generally my
satisfaotion at the statement made by him on the
part of the Portuguese Government in regard to the
loan which they seek to raise in Paris, and I haTe
stated to him that, under the limitations whioh he
had mentioned, the finanoial measureS taken by
Portugal for dealing with her creditors are a
matter entirely for her own deoision. 2
This was definitely not the German viewpoint.

As early

as October 1898, without aotive or stout oooperation of
England, Germany was attempting to force Portugal to
aooept a loan based on the revenues of her oolonies. 3
Tattenbaoh, the German Minister, tried again and again
to get British support in hiB efforts to force Portugal
to aooept 8 loan. 4 The German GOTemmentls oonoept of
the agreement was all too olearly indioated by their

1. Saiisbury to sir F. Lasee!1es, september 9,

-- Salisbury to Sir

1898, B.D., It No. 97.
2.

1898,

!.E.,

H. MaoDonell, November 7,

It No. 100.

3. Guedes,
4. llli.

t

2,£.&

oi t., p. 330.

p. 330.
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attitude then, just a short month after the signing
of what Eokardstein called a "hypothetical agreement. ltl
Sir H. MacDonell, English Minister to Portugal.
reported on July 22, 1899, the following resume of the
situation in October 1898.
I may here observe that, on my return to Lisbon
in Ootober last, I found Count Tattenbach had been
preSSing the Portuguese M1nisters--perhaps unduly-to aooept the good offices of our respective
Governments for the purpose of raising a loan; he
then unreservedly admitted to me that he understood
hie instructions to convey that one of the objeots
of the Anglo-German Agreement was to induce the
Portuguese Government to contract a loan in order
that, when its prooeeds had been extravagantly
wasted, we should remain wi th a olaim on the control of the Portuguese Colonial Customs.
I promptly informed him that I had reoeived no
such instructions from your Lordship, and that I
hoped he did not expect 1D8 to follow him in that'
line of action. 2

Despite German maohinations to the contrary,
the agreement never went into effect.

Nor did Portugal

find it necessary to borrow from the English, German
or French Governments.

The Portuguese debts were re-

finanoed from money that was obtained by small temporary loans based on home revenues at high rates of
interest, and from the sale of large amounts of produce

i. Sqpra, eh. tv, p. 77.
2. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury,
July 22, 1899, ~.~., It No. 112.
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arriving from the oolonies. l

Private French banks

raised muoh of this money.2
So it was then that by July 1899, less than
a year after the completion of the agreement, Sir H.
MacDonell could report that Count Tattenbach, German
Minister in Lisbon, had to admit that a marked improvement bad taken place in the finanoial situation
of Portugal and that the idea of a loan under the
Anglo-German Agreement was definitely out of the
question in any oase for the time being. 3 The tedious dalliance of the British Foreign Office in
making the agreement and then the studied delay ill
putting it into effect gives some substantiation to
Bertie's statement that Salisbury wanted to put Germany off until October, when conditions would be
better for England. 4

1. sIr k. MacDonell to Marquess of salisbury,
July 22, 1899, ~.~., It No. 112.
2. Garvin,

~.

!!i., III. 319.

3. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury,
July 22, 1899, ~.~., It No. 112.
4. Supra, Ch. IV, p. 83.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY OJ 1899 OR

THE SO-OALLED "WINDSOR TREATY"

!HE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY 0' 1899 OR
THE SO-CALLED WWINDSOR TREATY·
By

1899 the apparently isolated events of the

"ancient treaties" between England and Portugal, the
Boer situation, England's isolation, and the dormant
Anglo-German Portuguese colonial agreement
show an interesting relation.
~ecomes

be~an

to

This inter-relation

visible upon examination of the Anglo-Portu-

guese Declaration of 1899 erroneously known a8 "Treaty
of Windsor. n

Investigation of the Anglo-Portuguese

Treaty of 1899 shows how England resolved the dilemma
of keeping an old friend despite the fact that she had
made a treaty designed for the eventual disposal of
the old friend's possessions.

Never was the illogical

metaphor of "having one's cake and eating it, too,"
more literally executed.

Out of an apparently im-

possible situation England secured advantages from
both Germany and Portugal..

To understand how the

situation of 1899 was resolved, specialized recapitulation of the background in 1898 is necessary.
Throughout the negotiations for the AngloGerman agreement of 1898 the pronounced reluctance
and evident' lack of enthusiasm of England could be

•
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notioei.

Yet it was politioally and diplomatioally

neoessary for England to make the agreement with
Germany.

No one knew the character of this neeessity

IOOre olearly than the German Government., The inSight
of the German Government into the question is very
olearly explained by Hatzfeldt's demands to partioipate in the Portuguese loan.

These demands had much

the same oharaoter as an ultimatum.

Hatzfeldt's

report of this conversation with Salisbury on June l~.
1898, if exaot, shows a most adamant attitude. l He
said,
I explained in friendly but emphatic terms
that one-sided action in the matter here, involving actual or oontemplate' passing of Portugal's
sovereign rights in these colonies into British
hands, would make a very bad impression with us
and also would not tend to improve our relatione
whioh we both deSired, and that the question was
a political one Which he, salisbuq, and not '5'himber1ain,"""WOUld have II deold..
Baron Holstein reported a similar version at the interview. 3

The Kaiser substantiates Hatzfeldt's account

of pressure being brought to bear on England by his

1. SUpra, ch. III. p. 69.
2. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Offioe, June 1'. 1898,
Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. cit., III, 29; also ~.~., XIV,
No. 267. The undersooring is min••

s.

BulOW,

~.

!!i., II, 828.
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congratulatory message to BUlow. l
Of course, part of the English Government.
led by Chamberlain, had made overtures to Germ&n7
earlier in 1898 for a possible allianoe, only to
meet a rebuff.

Nevertheless, even the more hesitant

element of the oabinet led by Salisbury indicated
that a rapprochement Ddght still be desirable.

Con-

sequently, England was on record as wanting some sort
of an arrangement with Germs.ny.

In fact, the impend-

ing Boer holocaust and England's lack of allies made
such an agreement imperative.

Germany was well aware

of England's predicament, hence her
Chamberlain's overtures.

0001

reception of

She was also well aware of

her own colonial ambitions, as the reactions to the
Jameson Raid so well illustrated.

The neceSSity of

Germany's backing down from her initial adamant attitude after the Jameson Raid also showed her Government,
if not her people, the impossibility of sponsoring the
Boers against a maritime power.

This view had been

all too well understood by the German Admiral von
Tirpits.

Despite his hatred of England, he condemned

the official. policy and anti-English trend of German

{
1. Bulow, ~. olt., tI, 321. For a fUll quotation of the Kaiser s remarks to Hatzfeldt at this time
see Supra, Ch. IV, p. 93.

10.

public opinion at the time of the J8me80n Raid.
He believed that both government and publio opinion
had an lUlrealistio view of Germany's atrengthl --8Il
argument which would, of course. support his demands
for a larger fleet.

Here was a dilemma for

Germ~:

how could sh.

secure land in South Africa and yet aToid the danger
of an impossible war With England?

Realizing that

championing the Boers' oause might be strategioall7
wrong, in spite of the moral justification of sympathizing with these people, Germany perceived that she
should bow out as easily aa possible and yet make the
best bargain that she could for the good of the Reioh
and faoe-saving before German public opinion.
This appears to have been in the minds of the
German politioians throughout the negotiations.

It

is a view expressed early in the negotiations by
BUlow:

In leaving the English a free hand regarding Delagoa Bay and its Hinterland we take a step whioh
will oause a feeling of disapPointment amongst
the whole German people beoause the Boers for
years haTe beoome the object of a sentimental
s7Dlpathy whioh 8S in all oases of sympathy oannot
be oombated on grounds of logio. Therefore, the
Kaiser's Government, if it is not to suffer
oapitis diminutio, mnst be in a position to show

1. Tirpitz, A. Ton, !i Memoirs, pp. 5£ ff.
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that its polioy has not merely made renunoiations but has gained evident advantages.l
England, also, realized her own predioament
only too well; but she was able to turn it into a
diplomatic viotory.

She realized that she had to

Sign with Germany or else multiply her difficulties

in South Afrioa and Europe at a time when the Boer
question, as well as the Fashoda inoident, were
approaching a climax.

Sir Edward Grey expressed the

situation as follows:
It seemed clear from what I saw in them
[papers he subsequently read on the situation]
that the agreement had been made very reluctantly
so far as Lord Salisbury was concerned and only
in deference to German inslstence--pressure would
hardly be too strong a word. Crudely put, the
German insistence was this, "YOll [Bri taitU are
on bad terms with RuSSia and on bad terms with

1. BUiow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, G.t., .
XIV, 274. This also proves that Germany had ?rom the
very first resolved to get something concrete from
the agreement. Hence to the German Government it was
not a8 hypothetical as Eckardstein assumes in his Ten
Years. (Eckardstein, ~. oit., p. 182.) He, of course,
was explaining retrospectively according to the letter
of the agreement and not the spirit of the German
Government's interpretation of the agreement. Even
before this statement was made on the 22nd, Bulow
wrote to Hatzfeldt on the 8th, " • • • dass die Erlaiohterung, ..elcha wir dar fetahrlosen A.Ufitiiii Englana:.
durch unser. woEIioIIin a H8itEit I.w~.n, auch wIe
iiI•• in der Welt .lnan !reIs~. :i:other-iOras:
~ermany's-neutrarity' In South>~ica has its prioe
[Portuguestt Co10nie8) 1ilte everything else in the
world. (Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 8,1898, G.P., XIV,
253 t Pt. I.)
- -
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France. You C8.ll1'lOt afford to be on bad terms
with us. l
EVidently Chamberlain realized at the time -of the
aotual negotiations what Grey realized muoh later.
He said in a letter to Ealfour--during the negotiationa,
~he only advantage to us is the assuranoe of
Germany's abstention from further interference
in Delagoa Eay and the ~ransvaal.--in other words.
w. pay blaokmail to Germany to induce her not to
interfere where she has no right of interferenoe.
Well! it is worth while to p~ blaokmail 80metimes. 2

Here Chamberlain gave the clue to England's reasons
for Signing the treaty with Germany.
not without suooess.

~he

The polioy was

desertion of the Eoers by

the Reich and the deoline of German interest in the
Fashoda affair after the signing of the agreement of
1898 is not mere coincidence. 3
Throughout the negotiations for the AngloGerman Agreement and afterward, England continued to
maintain her relationship as usual with Portugal.
Apparently there was no lessening of the old frien4ship.

Early in the negotiations (June 12) England

had assured Portugal, fearing

1. Grey,

~.

2. Garvin.
3. Schmitt,

cIt.,

I, 44.

~. ~.t
~.

Ger~n

I, 316.

£!i., p. 144.

preasure on the
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loan situation, that her attitude would be the
same as it was in 18'3 when England stated she would
not be indifferent to foreign interference in Portugal's affairs. l There was one omission in this assurance which was immaterial in 18'3 but all importsnt
in 1898, namely, reference to integrity of pOBsessions.
This omission could have been purposeful.

It might

have been deliberately made to oause portugal some
anxiety which she would be eager to dispel as soon as
possible.

In any case, Portugal did grant England

certain ooncessions at the time of the AnglO-Portuguese Treaty of 1899.
Whenever Portugal beoame too apprehensive about
the arrangement pending in 1898 between England and
Germany, England would offer reassurances as to England's good intentions toward her old ally_

However,

although the reassursnces were enough to show that
England was still interested in Portugal's friendship,
they were just vague enough to inspire the proper
amount of anxiety.

Salisbury's and Balfour's promises

to Soveral to keep Portugal informed on the outcome of
the negotiations bear witness to this.!

<

It is perhaps

1. 5a!isbury to sir H. MacDonell, June 22, 1899,
B.D., I, No. 68; also Ibid., June 23, 1899, Enclosures

!

and 2.

2. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 83 and 90."
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even possible that Salisbury deliberately let Soveral
know something about the nature of the secret agreement between England and Germany to keep up this atmosphere of anxiety.

Soveral must have been told

something, otherwise he could scarcely have told
Grey that he knew all about the seoret treaty.
Soveral's account of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement
(contained in the French documents) substantiates
this.
On New Year's Day, 1899, the King of portugal
in a speech from the throne announced that the colonial
possessions of Portugal mnst be maintained 8S a sacred
heritage of the nation. l England's continued reluctance to force the agreement of 1898 and the obviously
overt efforts to convey to the world the impression
that Portugal and England were still the same friends
as always indioate at least tacit support of Dom
Carlos' statement.

Although most of the evidence

proving England's desire to stand by her old frient
is indirect and based on cOinoidenoe, it shows a
striking correlation to the failure of the AngloGerman Agreement to be oonsummated and the oonclusion
of the AnglO-Portuguese Agreement of 1899.

This
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correlation is so striking that it tends to support
the belief that England never fully intended to
throw over her old friend.
SUch an interpretation of the queer events of
1898-99 could well aocount for England's extreme ooncern for the integrity of Portugal at the same time
that she was making an agreement wi th Germany which
provided for a possible impairment of that integrity.
Evidenoe shows that England never wanted to foroe
the realization of the Anglo-German Agreement. l
England, to the exasperation of Germany, refused to
hinder portugal from securing loans whioh did not
impair the letter of the Anglo-German Agreement by
mortgaging the colonies in some way.2
What appears amusing now but was probably
extremely provoking and puzzling to the Germans at
the time was the faot that oloser relations were
aotually observed with Portugal after the oonolusion
of the Anglo-~erman Agreement than before. 3

The

Portuguese Ministry openly and deliberately proolaimed
the olose terms of this friendship and allianoe with

1.

Supra,

2. Fay,

ei. IV,

~. ~.,

3. Ibid., p. 134.

pp. 96-100.
p. 134.
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England. l

A few months after the conclusion of the

agreement with Germany, the British roys1 family, in
the spring of 1899, entertained Dom Carlos, King of
Portugal.!

This was but an extension of the friend-

ship Edward, Prince of Wales, felt for Portugal
throughout his 1ife. 3

Bulow blames much of the

failure of the realization of the agreement of 1898
on the intimate personal friendship between the

Marquis of Soveral and the Prince of Wales.'
Superimposed on the whole picture of AngloPortuguese relations from 1898 to 1899 is a pattern
of confused intrigue and bargaining based on mutual
fear of what each could do to the other in cooperation
with another power.

The approaching Boer War was the

basiS of the bargaining.

England could use this

agreement with Germany as a lever to force Portugal
to cooperate with her in the growing South African
orisis.

On the other hand Portugal could use the

crisis in South Afrioa and an agreement that she had
concluded in 1875 with the Transvaal to cauee England

1. Brandenburg,
2. Fay,

~.

~. ~.t

cit., p. 156.

p. 134.

3. Lee, Sir Sidney, Edward VII, It 70.

4. Bulow,

~. ~.,

I, 321.
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to respect the ominous potentialities of her neutrality and to value her oooperation in the approaching
war.

Aocording to the Transvaal-Portuguese Treaty

of 1875, Transvaal was able to use the Port of
Lorenzo Marques as its chief souroe of imports. 1
Since even before the Jameson Raid, the Boers had
been using the Port of Lorenzo Marques and the railway leading from it to the Transvaal for the transportation of vast quantities of armaments.!

Portugal

was in a position to cause the English to neutralize
the intentions of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898.
In the words of Theodore Wolff, the portuguese were
now in a position to stop the English from possibly
"pulling the coat off their back at a convenient
moment. 3

They could now remind the English with

good effect of the old alliance treaties which bound
the English "the proteotion of territorial integrity."'
On the other hand, England was in a better
position to bargain than she had been a scant year
previous--before the Germane pushed themselves into

1. salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, September 13,

1899,

~.~.,

2.

I, No. 113.

Seton-Watson,~. ~.,

pp. 277-278.

3. Wolff, Theodore, The. Eve-of
1914,
-- p. 263.

4. Ibid., p. 263.
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the loan negotiations

0

f Portugal. and England.

At

that time England desired concessions at Lorenzo
Marques.

Portugal was not anxious to gi~e them. l

In fact, the Portuguese had been very chary of conoessions until the intruding Germans appeared.

Thi8

might have been one reason that England decided to
allow Germany to intrude.

Ne~ertheless,

England

knew that Portugal still was able to cause extreme
embarrassment in South Afrioa, if not kept friendly.
Just thirteen days after the conolusion of
the Anglo-portuguese agreement, while Salisbury was
discouraging German attempts to force a loan on
Portugal, he reminded Portugal of the long-standing
agreements between England and Portugal. 2 The purpose of this reminder was to give reason to Portugal
to stop the shipment of arms to Transvaal.

Soveral

8aid that he could not see how portugal could oonsent
to

do

this.

not throw

However, he did say that portugal would

ove~

England in oase of a war.

In fact,

she would not even deolare her neutrality in oase of
an outbreak of hostilities.

A deolaration of

1. Memorandum b,. Ii'. BertIe on England and
Portugal in Afrioa, May 1, 1898, !.~., I, No. 65.
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, September 13,

1899,

B.E.,

It No. 113.
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neutrality would have made tacit cooperation with
England impossible.

England could not use the

strategic Portuguese colonial porta in Africa.
On the seventeenth

o~

September, MacDonell.

British representative in Portugal. communicated
with the Foreign Office on this same matter. l
Apparently he had been instructed to use pressure
on the Portuguese Foreign Mini8ter. who temporized
and suggested that England

ao

what Soveral had been

diligently atriying for, namely. arrive at a oomplete
understanding on the matter.

The Portuguese knew

when they had a good hand of oards and they intended
to get as much as possible out of it.
However, the British felt that they had been
dealt a good hand. too.

The frequent visits of

Hatzfeldt to the BritiBh Foreign Office led the
Portuguese to believe that Germany. in oonjunotion
with England. was about to enforoe the mysteriouS
olauses of the Agreement of 1898.

The British

played this fear for all it was worth.

The British

line of rea80ning was very similar to the following
aooount of MaoDonell to the Assistant

Under~eeoretary,

1. sir H. MaoDoneii to Marquess of Saiisbury.
September 17, 1899, !.~ .. I, No. 114 •.
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They are convinced that they have nothing to
from the Boers, so long as they stand b7
us, and, having fostered an exaggerated idea of
the value of their cooperation, fancy that the7
can set their own price on it.

~ear

On the other hand, so long as they au_peot
that we are aoting with Germany. they will alway_
fear that--whatever may be the fortunes of war-Germany will eventually profit, and may prevent
us from securing the integrity of their territory_
As regarda Lourenco Marques, they are well
aware that they oannot defend it and that the,
will inevitably have to appeal to us; but they
are also well aware that Germany knows this and
i8 8cheming aocordingly _ _ •
• __ In short, the situation here i_ a web of
unoertain't7" intrigue and confa.sion; the Ministers
being moreover not of a calibre to face it.
Soveral has until lately kept out of the wa;y
partl;y from opposition to the present Miniatry
8.1'1d partly to further hia Oft sohemes of upsetimg
the Anglo-German Agreement b;y a direct oonvention
with us. He is moreover firml;y convinced that all
thil TransTSal question hal been got up b7 Chamberlain, at Rhodes' and the Chartered Co., s instigation; this idea is in some measure shared by the
Government.
To sam up, my impression ia that the Portuguese
Government do not entirely trust us, hence their
idea of a oonvention whioh would aeoure them from
all danger not only from the Transvaal but also
from German;y_ To maintain themselves in their
Afrioan possessions under present ciroumstanoe8,
they required men and mone;y. Can we provide them
wi tbout the knowledge of Germany?l
l!'ive d81's later Salisbury informed the British
Ambassador in Lisbon that the possible action of

1. Sir I. iaoDoneii
1899, B.D., It Bo. 115.

--

to Dr.

Bertie, September

18,
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portugal in the event of war in South Africa had
been the subjeot of a oabinet meeting.

The Britleh

Government informed Soveral that in its judpent
Portugal oould not remain neutral in event of a war.1
The oabinet was willing to make a defensive al1ianoe

.

with Portugal against Transvaal in the event
war between England and Transvaal.
questions

0

Any

0

f a

specific

f military actions resulting from such an

allianoe would be deoided at the time of necessity.
Soveral's efforts to reestablish EngliSh oommitments
for the integrity of Portugal were beginning to bear
fruit.
Soveral soon deolared his approval of suoh. an .
arrangement and even volunteered to make arrangements
whereby further shipments of arms to the Boers oould
be stopped.!

The only thing that remained to be done

was to arrive at speoifio wording of the proposed reaffirmation of the old agreements.

Salisbury

preferred the wording of the "ancient treaties" to
Soveral's proposal whioh hinged upon the delioate
meaning of the word, "Bovereignty"--at a time when
1. s81isbury to sirR. MaoDone11, September 23,
1899, !.~.t I, Bo. 116.
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, Ootober 7,
1899, B.D., It No. 117. Also Enclosures 1 through 5
(soveral-to Salisbury, October 7, lagg).
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England was having extreme diffiou1ty with that
word's oontext in reference to Transvaal. 1

881i8-

bury insisted too that a definite olause be in.erte'
whereby Portugal would promise not to proo1aim
neutrality in the impending strife.! Sovera1 agreed
to Salisbury's suggestions on Ootober 7.

This waa

just five days before the Krueger ultimatum of
Ootober 12, which preoipitated the Boer War. 3 The
formal agreement was seoret1y signed on October 14.
1899 (two days after the Boer War broke out) and
oame to be called the ffWindsor Treaty," through
error by the Germans, who probably learned of it
later by roundabout means.

The error in the name

probably results from the German belief that the
treaty was cono1uded when the King of Portugal
(Carlos) visited the British Royal Family at Windsor
in 1899.

The real Treaty of Windsor was signed in

1904 when King Manoe1 signed an arbitration agreement
during a visit to Windsor.

The Germans might have

had a mistaken understanding of the contents of this
treaty.

Brandenburg's erroneous aooount of the

1. Soveral to Sall.burr, Ootober 8, 1899,
I, No. 117, Enclosure NOt a.

-

~.~.,

2. Ibid •• Eno1osure, No.5.
3. Ploetz' Manual

~

Universal History. p. 619.

i

_
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"Windsor Treaty" is a gOOd example of this misunderstanding. l
According to Bulow Germany did not know of
the exact meaning of this agreement until negotiations
were re-opened in the years 1912-1914 for the readjustment of the Anglo-German agreement of 189S. 2 He
states that he learned through a personal friend in
Paris of the treaty sometime before the remainder of
the German Government.

His excuse for not informing

the Government seems rather weak.

He did not want to

violate his friend's cOnfidenoe. 3

Bulow gives the

following account of his understanding of the "Windsor
Treaty" :
About the turn of the century I learned, through
the indiscretion of a foreign diplomat with whom
I had been on terms of friendship since my youth,
that Britain, a year after her agreement with
Germanr, had ooncluded a secret agreement with
Portugal; this was confirmed by news whioh reachecl
me from Paris banld.ng ciroles. This agreement,
the so-oalled Treaty of Windsor, expressedly oonfirmed existing treaties, in whioh the powerful
Britain and her client of many years past the
little Portugal, guaranteed one another's possessions, undertaking the reciprooal obligation to
oome in case of need to their defense. The oonclusion of the Treaty of Windsor had largely been
promoted by the then Prince of Wales, of whom the
Marquis of Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in
t

1. DranCIinburg,.u• .ill., pp. 156-'1 and 176.
2. Bulow, .2E, •

-

.2!i., I, 321.

3. Ibid., p. 492.
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London. was a personal Bnd intimate friend.
This Treaty of Windsor was, of oourse, in flagrant conflict with the spirit of the BritishGerman agreement conoerning the Portuguese
colonies. It was not only a guarantee for
Portugal, but actually an enoouragement to
that country not to mortgage her colonies. It
increased the old tendency of the Portuguese
to give preference to Britain in all eoonomio
questions. To say nothing of the fact that the
Treaty of Windsor further substantially increased the political dependence of the portuguese on Britain.l
This view is bard to accept because the King of Portugal made public reference to the new Tre.aty in a
speech in December, 1900 when the BritiSh Channel
fleet visited Portugal.

This fact was pointed out

by Eckardstein in his l!a Years.!

The British Doou-

ments substantiate him to a large extent.! Eckardstein's aocount (if true) of bis actions in reference
to the Anglo-portugue se agreement is very drunaging
to Berlin Foreign Offioe's olaim of ignoranoe of the
matter.

Eckardstein said that he asked Lord Lansdowne

in the BritiBh Foreign Office what the Portuguese
King's statement meant.

He was told that it was a

"reassertion of the AnCient Alliance" and that the

1. Bulow,

~.

cit., I, 321.

2. Eokardstein,

~. ~.,

p. 8S.

S. Editor's summary of facts concerning the
visit of the British Channel Fleet to Portugal
December 1900, B.D., I, 97-98.

--
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Anglo-German agreement of 1898 would be in no w87
affected by it.

Eokar~stein's

account says:

I telegraphed this at once to Berlin and a180
sent 8. copy of his letter to the above effect.
It is consequently incomprehensible to me how
the Berlin Foreign Office came to believe that
the expression "r88.ssertion of the allianoe"
referred to the Anglo-Portuguese boundar,v agreement of 1892 that gave Great Britain a right of
. preemption OTer Delagoa Bay, and w~ 13 years
later they were so surprised when the British
Government again brought up the Windsor Treat"
in the negotiations between Sir Edward Grey and
Prince Liohnowsky. For they had before them
the text of Lord Lansdowne's letter in which
the reaffirmation of the ancient alliance i.
expressly mentioned, and both the English and
portuguese papers explained that the King' 8
speech at Lisbon had referred to the reoent
ren val 0 f the 17th century allianoe. ~
On the basis of this evidence tit is hart to
explain the German indignation after 1900 at being
completely uninformed. unless Eokardstein misrepresented some facts, as Bulow intimates in his Memoirs,2
or unless the German Government deliberately assumed
an air of ignorance about the treaty of 1899 in order

to increase the feeling of animosity in Germany
against England.

This is particularly true after

the German navy program began to get under way and
after the Boer war broke out.

1. EokirdStein, .2R.. cit., p. 183.
2. Bulow, .2£.

ill.. p. 386.
t
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Bulow has pointed out the intensity of German
feeling on the matter:
• • • we should remind ourselves of the perfidious
duplicity with which, by means of the insidioua
"Windsor Treaty," Britain had gone behind our
backs to render ineffectual the treaty over the
Portuguese colonies just ooncluded with ua? Should
not this suggest distrust, must it not inspire
great caution? The harshness and ruthlessne.s
wi th whioh Britain was handling all the incidents
of the Boer War with regard to ourselves, the
close-fisted pettiness which she displayed towards
U8 and again particularly towards us in all colonial negotiations, were these encouragements to
cooperate Britain • • • yl
Brandenburg gives a more legalistic reaction,
which is impartial. to say the least.

Hia account i.

giTen below:
• • • as regards the Windsor Treaty of 1899 with
Portugal, erroneous title used here it would haTe
been more loyal and prudent not to haTe concluded
it, if England was in earneat about an allianoe.
But it occurred, as we saw, after the failure of
the. first overture, at a moment of sharp and almost
hostUe tenSion, and it did not run direotly
counter to her engagements with Germanr. though
it lent to them a 'Very narrow and unexpected !nterpretation.!
On technioal grounds Germany had good reaSon
to complain because the spirit of the Anglo-portuguese
agreement completely negated the spirit of the AngloGerman agreement.

HoweTer, the English statesmen

1. Mow .!!R.. cit •• p. 385.
t

2. Brandenburg, .!!R..

~.,

..

p. 176.
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would haye been much more unscrupulous had the7
honored the German agreement and sold their staunchest friend down the river.
One loses sympathy for the German cries of
perfidy when it is noted that the Reich, without
consulting England, as the spirit of the dormant
agreement of 1898 required, was attempting to aecure
portions of Angola as well as coaling stations in the
Azores, for an anti-British Navy.

Germany began to

attempt to gain these concessions from Portugal
before the existenoe of the "Windsor Treaty" was even
suspected.

All ahe knew at the

was that the 1898

t~e

agreement with England had not been immediately
successful because of a lack of English enthusiasm
in pushing over a weak old friend.
treaty of 189S was still a
which

Germa~

Nevertheless, the

~ ~

agreement b7

bound herself to act in conjunction

with England in disposing of Portuguese oolonies any
time after 1898.

No time limit had been specified

when the treaty was signed.

Hence Germany was just

a8 perfidious in spirit as England, if not more so.l
The treaty that was signed in 1899 was in
reality merely an exohange of notes reaffirming the

1. B.D•• 'lIlt 49 ff.

substantiating this point.

cites the documents
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old treaties. l

It had this added statement, how-

ever, "The government of His Most Fsi thful Majesty
Portugal will not proclaim neutrality in the war
between Great Britain and South Africa. we

Britain

had gotten the concession she wanted so badly from
Portugal just two days after the Boer War broke out.
By having a benevolent non-belligerent Portuguese
oolonial empire at her back in Afrioa, the outoome
of the Boer War was much more oertain for England.
There oan be no doubt that the so-oalled
"Treaty of Windsor" accomplished what Soveral wanted,
namely

t

of 1898.

the emasculation of the

Anglo~Germa.n

agreement

Portugal had played a shrewd and suooessful

game of diplomacy, but England was twioe winner; she
secured German abstinence from opposition to the
English South

Afr~oan

policy by one treaty against

an old ally and used that same treaty to bludgeon
support from Portugal in the South African situation-support that portugal would have otherwise hesitated
to give for fear of antagonizing the dangerous

BUB-

ceptibilities of Germany and her darling, the

i. see Appendix
1899 Agreement.

D for

complete text of

2. Anglo-portuguese Seoret Deolaration,
Ootober 14, 1899, !.]., I, No. 118.

the
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Transvaal.

Truly, "The German diplomats had been
decisively outmaneuvered. u1

1. Carroll,

~. ~., p.

408.

CHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE - 1912-1914

OHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE - 1912-1914
• • • both England and Germany have one
feeling in oommon, and that is fear of
another. Neither wants to be the first
to propose negotiations but both are
agreed that they should be brought about
though neither desires to make the necessary concessions.
--001. House to President Wilsonl
Following the chimerical results of the AngloGerman agreement of 1898 and the growing rivalry of
the two North-Sea powers, their relations grew more
and more strained.

Despite several attempts to

establish a closer bond between the two powers, an
atmosphere of extreme hostility developed.

This

development was given particular impetus after
Viotoria's reign

~nded,

when the Edwardian Era saw

the establishment of the Entente Oordiale between
France and England.
The agreement of 1898 remained a more or less
dormant issue
decade.

betwe~n

the two signers for over a

During this time relations between Portugal

and England were cordial.

During the first five days

1. Seymour, Charles, Intimate Papers of
Colonel Hous., I, 258.
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in April 1902, Edward VII visited Portugal.

In

8

speeoh before the assembled Chambers of Commeroe he
gave heartfelt assurances of the British intentions
to preserve the integrity of her loyal ally of Old. l
On November 16, 1904 King Manoel of Portugal visited
Windsor and signed a treaty of arbitration with
England.

This was the real "Treaty of Windsor"

8

name whioh many German authorities have erroneously
given to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of 1899. 2
Until about 1911 Portugal and England were
working to thwart German efforts to secure a harbour
in one of the Portuguese 0010ni8s. 3 For the nonoe,
at least, the erstwhile collaborators for an eventual
division of portuguese colonies were working at oross
purposes.

Reasons for this differenoe are explained

in the growing distrust resulting from the advanced
evolution of the alliance system and the naval
rivalry.

Nevertheless, there were powers at work in

England and in the oivil government in Germany whioh
would have liked to have olosed this ever widening
breaoh.

1. Benson, E. F., The Kaiset:
Relation., p. 182.

--

!:!!! His

2. B.D., VIII, 49, Editor's Note.
3.

B.~.,

VIII, 49 ff.

English
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Henoe it was that the fruitless 1898 agreement was remembered.

As early as June 23, 1911,

Germany began to inquire as to the possibility of
division of the Portuguese colonies through the
intermediary of Baron Stumm, who spoke to Sir F.
Bertie in Paris. l The inquiry was unofficial, sinoe
stumm was not conneoted with the Government at this
time.

Metternich, the German Ambassador to London,

hinted to Grey somewhat later that Germany would
like a division of colonies to take plaoe as soon as
possible.!

B.r 1912 Germany had specifically

suggested that negotiations on the Portuguese question
be revived. 5

The urgent need for amending relations

was obvious.
Circumstances seemed more opportune than they
had for some time.

The ancient Portuguese Monarchy

had been overthrown on October 5. 1910 b7 the republioans.

These republioans, with a somewhat narrow out-

look wished to find some scapegoat on Which to blame
Portugal's trouble.

They attributed exclusively and

1. Sir F. BertIe to Sir Edward Grey, Paris,
December 21, 1911, ~.~., X, Pt. II, No. 265.
2. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, December
29, 1911, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 266.
.

-3. Steed, H.

p. 587.

W., Through Thirty Years !,ill-,!!!!.
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conveniently the evils of the Monarchy, brought on
largely by carelessness and indifference and their
own legislative bickering, to the House of Braganza,
the Jesuits and the British Al1ianoe. l The German
Minister at Lisbon in 1913, in summarizing the course
of the revived negotiations up to January 20, 1913,
described the situation as follows:
In Germany the logical effeci for some years
after 1899 was necessarily that the Portuguese
busineSS was considered to have been a failure and
to be over and done with. Not until the efforts
of Imperial policy produced a desire for normal
relations on both sides of the North Sea was the
Portuguese colonial problem again brought to the
fore, less perhaps at first because of the intrinsio value of the Portuguese oolonies than in order
to find an advantageous basis for negotiations
between two oountries. • • The fall of the
Monarchy in Portugal made it considerably easier
for the British Government and public opinion to
further draw away from their ally, the Republic,
with its apparently chronically anarchical conditions, and after securing for England the most
valuable portions, to be content to make not inconSiderable ~acrifices in Germany's favour •••
As then 1898 England and Germany are agreeing
on a policy of partition, and Portugal again
equally appears to h~ve reached the end of
financial resources.!
Rosen's summary covers the resumption of the
Portuguese question very comprehensively and rather
aocurately; however, several pOints are omitted which

1. Bell, Aubrey F. G., "Chaos in Portugal,w
from These Eventual Years, p. 176.
2. F. Rosen, Minister at Lisbon to Chancellor
Betbmann Hollweg, January 20, 1913, Dugdale, E.T.S.
2R. Cit., IV, 221-222.
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give the English standpoint a somewhat different
sspeot.
It is hard to explain the British reasons
for permitting the long moribund question to be exhumed; however, it is a well-established faot that
Sir Edward Grey was extremely anxious to offer the
olive branoh to Germany in order to end the long
period of dissension. .l But what the German Government failed to understand was that while Sir Edward
Grey felt bound to honor engagements into whioh
Balfour and Chamberlain had unwisely entered, he
was equally determined not to be disloyal toward
Portugal.!
With Grey trying to satisfy these two inoompatible goals, the negotiations were doomed to have
s. stormy oourse beoause the Germans regarded as in-

sincerity what Steed oalls "two conourrent though
eventually incompatible honesties."3

Grey explains

his dilemma in this manner:

1. Robirtson, Malcolm, Introduction to Vol. tv,
German Diilomat1c Dooument., January !o, 19!!',-DUgd81e, .T.S.,~. ~., IV, xiv.

,

L __ ~____ _

2. Steed,

~. ~.,

3.

p. 338.

~.,

p. 338.
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As to the future it is olear from what Metternioh has already said to me that the Germans
would like the division of the Portuguese Colonies
to take plaoe as soon as possible. So Bhould I.
These Colonies are worse than dereliot BO long as
Portugal has them • • • the Union of South Afrioa
will never rest till it has Delagoa Bay: on every
groWld material and moral and even Portuguese it
would be better that Portugal should sell her
Colonies. But how oan we of all people put pressure on Portugal to sell: we who are bound by an
Allianoe to proteot and preserve her Colonies for
Portugal--an Allianoe renewed seoretly for value
reoeived during the Boer war? And Portugal won't
part with her Coloniea--any regime in Portugal
that did so would be overturned by a revolution-for when nations have gone down hill till they are
at their last gasp their pride remains undiminished, if indeed it is not inoreased. It olings
to them as Taoitus says the love of dissimulation
olung to Tiberius at his last gasp.l
Trevelyan, Grey's apologist, states that he attempted
to olarifY rather than to oomplioate the tangle. 2 At
any rate England did not do as Tirpitz blatantly
accused--deliberately offer Germany territory that was
not English in order to plaoate Germany.3 Lord
Haldane, speoial'representative to Berlin in 1912,
explained the situation as merely being an undertaking
to agree about possible zoneswhioh each nation might
purohase or exploit should they be placed on the

1. Sir Edward Grey to sir E. Goschen, December

29, 1911,

~.~.,

X, Pt. II, No. 266.

2. Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon, pp.269 ff.
3. Asquith, H. H., Genesis of the
- War,
- p. 97 •
.
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market. l

This explanation, of course, wall only the

literal interpretation.

Potentially the treaty was

much more dangerous for Portugal.

However, Germany

was the initiator of the new negotiations, not
England.
While the conversations for a renewal of the
1898 agreement began as early a8 1911 under the guid-

ance of the German Ambassador Metternich, it was not
until 1912 that the negotiations began to take a
more definite shape under the guidance of Prince
Lichnowsky, the new German Ambassador, who took over
in November 1912.

He began energetioally, almost at

the moment of his arrival, to attempt to acoomplish
something definite on the Portuguese question.

Within

three days after he presented his oredentials to
London he was able to induoe Grey to draw up a draft
agreement revist'ng that of 189S. 2
Lichnowsky was very well liked in London and
apparently enjoyed the confidence and cooperation of
the government there to a remarkable degree.

Through-

out his aocount of the drawn out (two years) dealings
on the question he showed a generous appreciation of

1. H81dane, visoount, Richard Burdon, Before
the War. p. 145.

--

2. Nicholson,

I

~.

!!!., p. 285.

111

England's viewpoint.

Liohnowsky was interested i.

the oonoomitant possibilities of the treaty a8 much
as, if not more than, the possibility of immediate
material gain it offered Germany.

The ne" German

Ambassador oompletely understood Grey's insistenoe
on publishing both the Anglo-German agreement on
Portuguese colonies as it would be revised and the
Anglo-Portuguese Deolaration of 1899.

Grey had

arrived at suoh a decision long before Lichnowsk7
took over the negotiations--in January 1912 to be
exact. l At this time Grey was personally opposed to
secret treaties whioh he regarded as embarrassing and
inoonvenient.! Despite the rather oallous negotiations that occurred under Grey's supervision as to
what country might get what section of portugal's
domain, it seems that Grey did not want to'regard
the possibility of a restatement of the 1898 agreement purely aa a means of enlarging the domain of the
Empire.

It would seem rather that Lord Haldane was

right.

Grey merely wanted to use the renewed negotia-

tions as a means of destroying the rancor ·in

Germa~

1. Grey's Minute to Sir Eyre orowe's Memorandum
on Timor and the Anglo-German Secret Conventions of
1898, January 26, 1912. ~.~ •• X. Pt. II. No. 270.
2. Grey to Sir Franois Bertie,

No. 364.

~.~

•• X, Pt. II,
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and the uncertainty in Portugal resulting from the
diplomacy of 1898-1899.

Guedes states that Gre7

J

promised the Portuguese President Teixeira Gomea
categorioally that he would not sign the modification
without the expressed condition that it would be
immediately published as would also be the embarrassing secret treaties of 1898 and 1899. 1 Grey's probable
reasons for publishing all of these agreementa simultaneously was to show to the world that England was
not as perfidious as the mystery about the 1898-99
situation made England appear.

He. of course. had to

publish the treaties if he wanted to show their hypothetioal nature and if he wanted to allay the suspiciona
of Franoe that England was about to debilitate the
strength

0f

the Entente Cordia:!.e. 2 Here again Gre7

was striving to overoome another dilemma--establish
better relations with Germany while keeping Germany"
enemw, France. friendly to England.
Lichnowsky's appreciation of these delicate
intrioacies is best shown by a note with whioh he
prefaced his discussion of the Anglo-German Colonial
Convention in his

1. Guedes.
2.

~.~.,

A!! !!! Wege !!! Absrund--Heading
~.

cit., p. 336.

X, Pt. II, 559 ff.

L______ ~

lSS

ill !a! Abyss:
From the outset the British Government, for
reasons of home and foreign policy, laid it down
as saine %U non for the conclusion of a new
treaty tha
o~the new treaty and all the old
ones should be published. Sir E. Grey also oonsidered it of great importanoe that 'thiS treaty
should demonstrate the unanimity between the two
Governments and show the world that it was
possible to reaoh agreement in such fields.'
Despite this plain statement it was not till
shortly before the outbreak of the war that the
German Foreign Offioe could be induoed to permit
the publioation and ratifioation of the new
treaty, long after it was oomplete! One pretext
after another was sought in order to find some
way of rendering the trea~, abortive. --The whole
attitude of the British Minister, at any rate,
showed his Sincere desire for a rapproohement
with us. l

b

Even though the conditions requisite to a
signing of an agreement seemed unsurmountable, the
German Ambassador"was able to get a revised agreement
down on paper.

All that remained was to iron out

speoial ohanges that eaoh side wanted to insert into
the old arrangement.

To aocomplish this, tediOUS

diokering oontinued from December 1912 to Ootober 20,
1913, when a final draft was initialled (not officially
signed) by Grey and LichnoWSky.2

Most of the agreement

was very similar to that of 1898.

Several significant

p. 270.

1. Prinee Lichnowsky, Reading for the AbysS,

2. B.D., X, Pt. lIt pp. 428-540. Also G.P.
XXXVII, 13-86. See Appendix E for text and Appendix G
for illustration of territorial disposition.

~-------------------~- -

-_._-~~--.
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alterations were made, however.

These alterations

were explained by the German Minister at Lisbon's
oomments on the agreement to his Chanoellor.

Re

said:
In the nature of the case comparison of the
two Conventions follows on two lines, partition
of spheres of interest and the posSibility of
making the Convention effective. The loss of the
Portuguese half of the island of Timor--the gaining of whioh by us was always more than problematioal--and of the strip on the left bank of the
Zembezi is, in my op1nion, more than paid for b1
our aoquiring the oentral part of Angola and by
the British desinteressement regarding st. Thomas
and Prinoipe, whIoh two islands form the most
valuable part of all portugal's oolonial Empire.
What we give up in Afrioa--the Zambezi territory
whioh is entirely controlled oommeroially by
Englishmen, and a oomparatively small portion of
eastern Angola, is hardly worth oonsideration as
against the faot that now our sphere of influenoe
in Angola'wUl. with German Southwest Afrioa,
form a compact oolonial territory with a ooast
covering 20 degrees Longitude, whose good harbours
and fertile highlands, suitable for settlement,
promise highly prosperous future developments.

As regards part it i on 0 f the country the advan-tages of the new Convention seem to me even
greater, when I oonsider its possibilities. The
Convention of 1898 was founded on the assumption
that portugal was faced with an inevitable
financial collapse and would be glad to pledge
her colonial customs for a loan granted by Germany
and England. This assumption proved false. Sinoe
then Portugal has raised no loans of any size.
Financially she has--although with difficulty-kept her head above water, and lately she appears
to have wiped off her defioit and balanoed her
Budget. Your Excellency has realised this in good
time and has thought well to introduce into the
new Convention oertain olauses taking aocount of
our aspiration without reference to Portugal's
need of a loan, so that we need not fear again
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that what we have won by treaty will be lost
to us in practice. l
What Rosen significantly adumbrated in the
closing lines of his dispatch was the most radical
departure in the new agreement from that of 1898.
T.he eighth clause in the Draft convention of 1913
made provision for jOint interference by the German
Reich and British Empire in the Portuguese Empire
in event of any disturbanoe or irregularity in the
Portuguese colonies which would endanger the lives,
property, or vital interests of German and British
citizens.

If the treaty were aotivated with such

8

clause, the realization of its material aims would
be accomplished much more easily by the designing
powers.
Grey probably realized the terrifio import
of this clause.

Hence his inSistence on the publioa-

tion of the treaties so as to leave no element of
doubt anywhere.

ETeryone ooncerned. including Por-

tugal, would realize the enormous potentialities of
the treaty and would oonsequently do everything to
avoid creating an exouse for its consummation.

This

1. F. Rosen, at Lisbon, to the Chanoellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg. November 9th. 1913. Dugdale, E.T.S.,
££. £!ie, IV, 228-229.

p

186

•
would aot

8S

a brake on the Portuguese inefficiency

and possibly lead to reformation of the very unstable
political situation in portugal that the Germane were
banking on for the realization of their aspirations
in the draft agreement.

This was specifioally ex-

pressed by Rosen in his report of January 9, 1913.
Rosen, Solf (German Colonial Seoretary), and
Lichnowsky were not opposed to immediate publication.
However, the German gOTernment hesitated in spite of
the fact that Grey stated that he would not offioially
sign the new agreement unless it were made publio.
Liohnowsky said that his government refused
to acoede to Grey's requirement beoause there were
people in the government who were personally jealous
of his successful beginnings on a new Anglo-German
understanding. 1 Although this might have some bearing on the oase it is likely that the German government had a more fundamental reason than this.
Probably Germany did not want to make portugal wary
and then, too, if the treaties were openly proolaimed,
Frenoh suspioions of England would be allayed.

France

would see that England had not concluded a revolutionary agreement with Germany but merely

1. Lichnowsky,

~.

cit., p. 61.

~

clarification

of an agreement that originated before the establishment of the Entente Cordiale.

German apologists suoh

as Count Montgelas maintain that the Germans were
more sincere about the ultimate possibilities of a
broad understanding that this revival possessed than
was England. l However, the main ourrent of German
polioy at this time disproTes Montgelas' contention.
Germany might haTe reopened the treaty in the weak
hope of using it as a means of purchasing British
nentrality.2

Grey's insistence on publication of the

documents would destroy this value of the negotiations
beoause the exhibition of the oontents of the treaties
would show that England had no desire to arrive at an
understanding with Germany at the expense of the
English allies.

France would know that she was not

being deserted.

Publioation would show that the

foundation of the Anglo-German arrangement was laid
years before the Entente Cordiale was consummated.
Suoh an interpretation of the actions of Berlin in
these negotiations gains credence when it is observed
that Bethmann-Hollweg suddenly agreed to publication

1. Montgeias, Max, British Foreign Policy
under Grey, p. 52.
2. Dugdale, E.T.S.,
(Editor's Note).

~. ~.,

IV, 217

l~

of the documents in question on July 2, 1914. 1
Germany was willing to accede to the British oonditions of publication only at the last moment before
the war broke out.

They did this in the vain hope

that suoh a concession to British desires might
purchase British neutrality in the forthooming confliot.

The Archduke

Fr~~z

Ferdinand and his wife had

been assassinated June 28.
The epilogue to 1898 merely substantiates what
the tangle of 1898-99 began to vaguely indioate.

The

duel for Empire might allow for understanding on small
points, but fundamental differences were too large to
make possible a unity of aotion.

Nicholson correotly

sums up the situation by saying nAnglo-German friendship remained t however, superficial.

Beneath the

sugar-ooating of these amenities the old fear and
rivalry had lost none of its bitterness. n2

1. Lichnowsky to the Chancellor, July 14, 1914,

~gdale,

E.T.S.,

~. ~.,

2. Nicholson,

IV, 233.

~. ~.,
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CHAl'TER VII

.

CONCLUSIONS--WHO PAID THE PIPER
If judged in the cold light of objeotivity
and theory, Lord Carnook (Arthur Nioholson) waB
oorrect when he called the convention regarding the
Portuguese colonies the most oynical bUSiness that
he had ever run aoross in his whole experience of
diplomaoy.

A friend, whose loyalty had been proven

for over five hundred years, was the unwilling subject
of negotiations between the world powers whose rivalr7
was very outspoken.

Portugal was given no voice in

the negotiations which took advantage of her internal
weakness to use her as a means of placating, temporarily, two ravenous powers bent upon ultimately
destroying one or the other.

The apparently useless

friend was to be the soapegoat.

This interpretation

is the most evident one and superficially at least-if only the theoretioal aspeots are coneidered--ie
quite plausible and true.

However, the fact still

remains that the Portuguese Empire is intact to this
day with the possible exception of Timor which is
jeopardized by a power not directly involved in the

1898-1914 negotiations.

During World War I portugal

and England remained allies as of old and fought side
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by side against Germany, with whom the letter of
the Anglo-German colonial treaties had provided for
a possible partition of the Portuguese colonies.
The old Portuguese alliance was stronger than the
possibilities contained in the Anglo-German oolonial
deolarations.
Evidently, then, in

~pite

of the theoretioal

provisions of the Anglo-German colonial agreements,
Portugal had not been deserted by her time-proven
ally.

There are several possible explanations that

made the ominous situation turn out so favorably for
Portugal.

A first and obvious explanation might be

that England neTer intended to desert her old friend
and remained true to her alliance commitments of old.
A seoond explanation might be that Portugal's friendship still had a material value to England despite
the chaotic condition of portugal's government.

A

third explanation might be found in coinoidental
events, which by chanoe made possible the continuanoe
of the old relationship.
Salisbury's unvarying reluctance to conclude
the agreement with Germany end his shifting the responsibility of it to his nephew might be
the first explanation.

~sed

as proof of

Salisbury never relished the

-------~-
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idea of the treaty.

His promises to keep Soveral

informed and his probable informing Soveral of the
contents of the treaty of 1898 would tend to substantiate a belief that the English Cabinet, or at
least a most influential part of it, never really
intended to sell Portugal "down the river. ltl
Possibly Salisbury let the Chamberlain element of
his Cabinet play with the idea of an alliance with
Germany based on a colonial agreement.

By dOing this

he could fUse the odd elements in his government.
There were several factions in the Cabinet.
evidence to support this is abundant.
at odds with his own nephew.

Indirect

Salisbury was

Sir Francis Bertie's

retrospective interpretation of Salisbury's declining
influence in his own Cabinet substantiates this. 2
Guedea declares that there were differenoes on the
oolonial questions between Salisbury and Chamberlain. 3
This difference between the Colonial Secretary
the Prime Minister approached a rivalry.'

and

Salisbury

1.

Supra, Ch. IV, pp. a1 ff. Also Supra, Ch. V,
pp. 106-107.
2. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, January 12,
1912, ~.~.t X, Pt. II, No. 268. Also Supra, Ch. iV, p.a3.
3. Guedes, .2.ll• .ill. t p. 330.
4. Hoyningen, Heinrioh Freiherrn von, Undersuch~S!n zur Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bundnisprob~, IS98-1901, p. ln97
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might have used this situation in his Cabinet to
bait Germany into believing that there was a possibility of foroing England to reach a colonial agreement by playing one element of the Cabinet against
the other.

All the time he may never have intended

to use the treaty unless compelled to, because of
respect of the foroe of publio opinion, Which never
would have fully oondoned the desertion of portugal. 1
The fact that the portuguese Government, never
extremely anxious about the negotiations, remained
on the best of terms with England throughout is
possibly an indication of some kind of assuranoe
that England would never desert her.

This faot i.

either an indication of assurance or an indioation
that the secret elements of the treaty were
seoret.

real1~

However, the negating effect of the subse-

quent English and Portuguese Treaty of 1899 seems to
disprove the latter conoept.

That is, the portuguese

mnst have known of the secret agreement between
England and Germany, otherwise they would not have
entered into the agreement of 1899 with England.
Soveral's profession of complete knowledge of the
negotiations of 1898 al.so refutes this view.

1. Liohnowsky,

~. ~.,

p. 312 •.
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The second explanation of the ineffectiveness of the German-English Colonial Agreement has
even more sUbstantiation.

Portugal's friendship

still had a definite value in 1898.

At this time

Germany thought she had England in an embarrassing
position and sought to gain what she could in return
for German neutrality in the Boer situation.

Con-

sequently, England was foroed, more or less, to sign
the agreement.

However, instead of getting what she

had expeoted beoause of this treaty, Germany was
aotually thwarted.

Now Germany oould not aot unless

she aoted in oonjunotion with her oo-signer, England.
If England refused to aot, Germany had to wait.

The

German government oould not oomplain to the world
about the unfairness of suoh purposeful dallianoe
because it would immediately reveal its own seoret
involvement in a despicable agreement which the world
oould decry and whioh other powers probably would
demand to be settled by an international conferenoe
of some sort.

Such a conference would, of oourse.

destroy any advantages England and Germany would
jointly enjoy as a result of the secret agreement.
However, it would not destroy righls

o~

pre-emption

to oertain portions of the portuguese Colonial Empire
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which England had held by previous bona fide agree-

--

mente between the British Empire and Portugal.
GermanJ unwittingly forced herself by poor judgment
in treaty making--while forcing

England-~to

depend

on the doubtful possibility of England's agreeing to
overthrow Portugal.

This was a possibility which

England never could afford to make actual as long as
there was a Boer danger.

Portuguese benevolenoe in

the forthooming war was too valuable.

The Declaration

of 1899 between Portugal and England amply proves this
pOint.

The suspeoted assurances Salisbury gave

Soveral would also tend to prove this as would Portugal's oontinued friendShip and relative calm amid
the overtly despicable negotiations of England with
Germany.
The third explanation of the failure of realization of the declared results of the oolonial negotiations depends on oiroumstanoe.

If the Boer danger had

not been present in 1898 and if the World War had not
oome at the very moment a seoond agreement was about
to be signed in 1914, and if more adroit diplomats
had framed the German course of action, Portugal might
have been sacrificed as the
1898-1914 seem to indicate.

coloni~l

agreements of
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Perhaps a simpler interpretation than any
of the three given would be a statement saying that
events show that the Anglo-German colonial agreements
never realized their avowed purpose beoause they were
at cross purposes with the oourse of the greater
current of the history of the time--duel for empire.
Specific oonolusions concerning the negotiations can be made however.

They are as follows:

1. Portugal unconsciously set up the situation
for the Anglo-German colonial agreements by asking
for a loan based on colonial revenues at a time when
her financial oredit was of doubtful value.
2. Germany in each instance instigated the
negotiations between the Reich and England fpr disposal of Portugat's colonies.

England entered the

agreements only after German pressure pointed the way.
3. portugal gave no approval to the AngloGerman agreements which ignored her sovereign right
to have a voice in the disposal of her own property.
4. portugal did not lose her Empire even
though England and Germany had an agreement providing
for an eventual division.
5. Germany was definitely out-maneuvered.
6. Portugal received more material benefit
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from her seoret treaty than did Germany.

The Por-

tuguese oolonies were more valuable to England
during the Boer War as Portuguese colonies than

88

German possessions.
7. The Boers lost their best hope for aid
because of the Anglo-German and Anglo-portuguese
agreements.
8. Chamberlain was partially to blame that
his desired alliance with Germany was never realized
because it was at cross purposes with his colonial
ambitions.
9. There was not oomplete unanimity in the
British government on the desirability of oonoluding
the Anglo-German-Portuguese deal.
10. Secret treaties become increasingly more
embarrassing in proportion to the time they have peen
kept seoret.
11. England and Germany arrived at an agreement
on the portuguese question because of the desires of
some members of the Governments of the two Empires.
However, the general policy and destiny of the nation,
and their government never sincerely or enthusiastically pursued such a desire.

Specific agreements on

isolated pOints of differenoe between rival powers

I
!.
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are valueless unless a broad sinoere general understanding has been reaohed and supported by the entire
government of both oontending powers.
12. Both England and Germany were using the
colonial agreement for ulterior reasons.

England's

ulterior reasons for signing the agreements with
Germany have been fully explained.

Germany had other

reasons besides oolonia1 gain whioh oaused her to
sign.

Bulow (in retrospective disoussion) says that

the treaty was merely a trial balloon to determine
if England was still perfidious Albion: "In this
treaty of 1898

I was oonoerned not only for the

aotua1 subjeot of negotiations, the Portuguese
possessions in Afrioa, but also for the opportunity
of establishing how far we oan rely on British
fides."l

~

The military elements of the German govern-

ment wanted the treaties to aot as a oamouflage of
friendliness for their inoreased rivalry for naval
supremaoy.2

It is believed that the revival of the

negotiations prior to the world war was made with the
hope of getting England to remain neutral if a world

1. Bulow,

~.

£!i., I, 320.

2. Dugdale, E.T.S.,

~.

oit., IV, 217.
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war were to occur. l

According to Lichnowsky,

England was anxious to turn German energies into
channels less dangerous to England.

The English

had some hope of sublimating the energy expended in
Germany on an increased navy into a less harmful
(to England) policy of colonial expansion. 2

Colonel

House was probably right then when he said that each
power was afraid of the other but unwilling to make
the concessions that would make for a straightforward understanding.
13. The agreement of 1913-1914 was an outgrowth

of 1898.
14. The agreement of 1913-1914 was more danger-

ous to. the integrity of Portugal.

15. Germany and England had different concepts
of the treaties.

England believed that the treaties

would not become effective until the sovereignty of
portugal was impaired.

Germany believed this too,

but she wanted to contribute to the impairment of the
sovereignty so that the treaties could become active.
16. The background of the Anglo-German-Portu-

guese colonial problem indicated that a departure from

1.

Dugdale,

E.T.S.,

2. Lichnowsky,

~.

~.

cit.,

IV,

!!i., p. 226.
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splendid isolation was

i~nent.

However, Salisbury,

one of the last champions of this theory of policy,
whose archaic nature even he reluctantly realized,
made perhaps the last brilliant play of this policy.
While England stood alone he shrewdly played other
powers against one another to extricate England from
a difficult situation.

He played the needs, ambitions,

and fears of Germany, Transvaal, portugal and France
against one another.

"Salisbury without exaggeration

was one of the greatest British foreign ministers of
the century.

After Bismarck's fall, his primacy in

world politics was unchallenged."l
Muddling through had won another brilliant
victory.

portugal did not pay the piper as the theory

of the treaty would have one believe.

The seoond-rate

statesmanship of Wilhelminian GermB.I1y oaused the Reioh
to pay the piper.

1. Ward and Gooch,

.Q.E..

cit., III, 262.
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APPENDIXES

I.

APPENDIX A

Convention s1gned on the 30th instant
between Great Britain and Germany, respecting tbe position of the two Powers in
oonneotion with a possible loan to Portugal
on the security o~ the custoM revenues of
the Portuguese Province. of MOzambique an!
Angola, and the Portuguese portion of the
Island of Timor. l
Enclosure in No. 90
COJ1TentioJl
In view of the possibility tha.t Portugal -7
require financial assistanoe from some fbreign Power
or powers., and in order to obviate the international
oomplications whioh suoh a condition of things may
produoe, and to preserve her integrity and independenee, the Undersigned. duly authorised by their
respective Sovereigns, have agreed as follows:
I. Whenever eitberthe British or the German
Govermnent is 0 f opinion that it is expedient to
acoede to a request for an advanoe of money to Portagal on the security of the CustODl8 revenues or other
revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and the Portuguese
part of the Island of Timor, it sliall commnnicate the
fact to the other Govermnen1i, and the other Government
shall have the right to advance a portion of the total
BUll required.
In the event of the other Government signifying its intention to exeroise this right. the two
Governments shall consult as to the terms of the two
loans, and these loans shall be issued on the security
of the Customs revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and
Portuguese Timor as near as possible simnltaneously.
The loans shall bear as near as possible the same
proportion to eaoh other 8S the amounts of the Customa
revenues respectively assigned as their security.
The loans shall be issued on terms 8S favourable
to Portugal as the oondition of the money market and

1898,

1. Mr. B8ifour to sIr F. Lasoe1les, August 31,

~.~.,

I, pp. 71-72, Enclosure No.
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the security of the loans permit, and shall ill other
respects be subject as near as possible to similar
conditions.
II. Of the Customs revenues, referred to 1l'l
Article I, those of the Province of MOsambique south
of the Zambeli, and of the part of that province lying
on the left bank of the Zambazi above ita confluence
with tne Shire, and those of the portions of the
Province of Angela, as hereinafter described, shall
be aseigned to the British loan. The Customs revenues
of the remaining parts of the ProvinceS of Mozambique
and Angola and the Customs revenues of Portuguese Timor
shall be assigned to the GerDBll loan.
fhe portion of the Province of Angola, of
which the Customs revenues shall be assigned to the
British loan .. is comprised within the follwwing 11m1ts:
the northern frontier shall run from the coast along
the 8th parallel of south latitude to the 16th degree
of longitude east of Greenwich, thence it shall
descend that degree to the 9th· parallel of latitude,
and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as
the frontier of the Congo hee State. fhe southern
frontier shall start from a point on the ooast I
Engliah miles north of Egito, and shall run thence
due east t~ the eastern frontier of the Province of
Angola. The western frontier shall be the sea; the
eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit of the
Province of Angola.

III. Any Delegates sent by Great Britain or Germany
to take note of the colle ction of the revenues which
are the security for ~tr respective loans shall have
on17 rights of inspection, but no rights of administration, interference, or control, 80 long as there is no
default in the payment of interest or siIlking fund.
IV. In case of default in the payment of the
interest or sinking fund of either loan, the administration of the various oustom-houses in the two
provinces and in Portuguese Timor shall be handed
over by Portugal; those assigned for the German loan
to Germany, those assigned for the British loan to
Great Britain.
T. It is Will understood that allrtghts, whether
British or German, acquired in the provinces affeoted
before the date of this Convention, shs;t.l be f12l17
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safeguarded, provided they are of 8. purely private
character, and convey neither political rights nor
territorial or administrative Jurisdiction.
It is also understo cd that no influence wUl
be used in the future, either by the British or the
German Government., to obtain fresh Conoession.,
except in those portions of the proTinces of which
the custome revenues are assigned to their respective
loans.
VI. The present Convention shall be ratified, and
the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon
as possible. The Convention shall come into foroe
immediately after the exchange of ratifications.
In Witness whereof the Undersigned. dul7
authorised, have signed the same. and have affixe'
thereto their seals.
Done in duplicat•• at London. the 30th day of
August. 1898.
(L • S. )

(L.S.)

i

l
i
,

AR THOR JAMES BALFOUR

P.

RATZ~ELDT

APPENDIX :B
Secret Convention betwee~ Great Britain
and Ge rm8lll'1
Enclosure in No. 91
Secret Convention
Whereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Convention of this day's date, it may unfortunately not be found possible to maintain the
integrity of the African possessions of Portugal
south of the Eluator, as well a8 of those in Timor,
the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective
Sovereigns, have further agreed as follows:
I. Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to
oppose the intervention of ~ third Power in the
Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, and in Portuguese
Timor, either by way of loan to Portugal on the
security of the revennes of those provinces, or by wa7
of aoquisition of territory, by grant, oession, purchase, lease, or otherwise.
II. It is understood that, from the conclusion of
the Conventions of this day's ~te, Great Britain will
abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to
the possession, occupation, control, or exercise of
political influence in or over those portions of the
Portuguese provinces in which the Customs revenues
have been assigned to Germany, and that Germany will in
like manner abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control, or
exercise of political influence, in or over those
portions of those Portuguese provinces in which Customs
revenues have been assigned to Great Britain.
III. In case Portugal renounces her sovereign rights
over MOzambique, Angola, and portuguese Timor, or
loses these territories in any other manner, it i8
understood that the subjects of, and natives of the
Protectorates of, one Contraoting Party, together with
their goods and ships, and also the produce and the
manufactures of its dominions, posseSSions, Colonies

1. Ii. Balfour to Sir F. Lasceiies, August 31,

189S, B.D., It '1S, Enclosure No. 91.
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and protectorates, shall, in such portions of the
territories comprised in the present Convention as
may fall to the other Contracting Party, participate
ia all the prerogatives, exemptions and privileges
with regard to trade, commerce, taxation and navigation which are there enjoyed by the subjects of, and
natives of the Protectorates of, the other Contracting Party.

IV. With refard to the vth Article of the Convention of to-day s date, which refers to private rights
of British or German subjects in the Provinoes of
Mozambique, Angola, and the Portuguese Timor, it is
well understood between the two Govenunents ~hat this
Article applies, among others, to the so-calle'
Katembe Conce8sion, and, fUrther, that the Government
of Great Britain wUl adopt a friendly attitude in
respect to the oonfirmation of this ConceSSion by the
Portuguese Government in case such a confirmation
should be applied for.

v. !he present ConTention shall be ratified, and
the ratifioations thereof shall be exohanged a8 soon
as possible. The COJl9'ention shell come into force
immediately after the exohange of ratifioations.
In witness whereof the 17ndereigned, dul,.
authorised, have Signed the same, and have affixed
thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, at London, the 30th day of
August, 1898.
(L.8. )

(L.S.)

ARTHUR JAMES :BALFOUR

P. HATZFELDT

APPENDIX C

Seoret Rote, Signe d b7 Count Hatsfeldt
and A. J. Balfourl
Bncloaure in No. 92
Secret Note
In order to make clear the intention of the
two Conventions of thi8 day's date, it is further
understood between the two Governments as follows:
In the event of one of the two Gevernments
obtaining from the Portuguese Government before the
oontingency oontemplated in Article III of the Secret
Convention a cession of territory, or the conce8sion
of special privileges not of an cccasional charaoter,
in those portions of the Portuguese Provinoes of
Mozambique, Angola, or Timor, the oustoms revenues of
which have been assigned to it, it is well understood
between the two Governments the.t such cessions of
territory, or oonce8sions of privileges, shall not
beoome operative until analogous grants as near 8S
possible of equal value have been accorded to the
other Government in those portions of the provinces.
the oustoms revenues of which have been 8ssigned to
it by the present arrangement.·

In oase either Government applies for special
privileges of an ocoasional oharaoter, it shall
immediately inform the other Government, and if these
privileges are granted, and if the other Government
should desire it, Shall use its influenoe to obtain
for the other Government similar speoial privilege.
of an ocoasional oharacter and of equal value.
And whereas, owing to the imperfect survey.
whioh alone are at present available, the lInd
A~icle of the Convention of this dayls date may not

1. This note explains the posItion of Grea'
Britain and Germany in certain eventUalities in regard
to the Portuguese pcssessions in Africa, south of the
Equator, and the Portuguese portion of the Island of
Timor. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. LaBoelles, August 31,
1698, B.D., I, '14-5, Enolosure No~ 92.

--
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exactly carry out the intentions of the Contracting
parties, it is understood between them that in aD7
oase the port and town of Ambriz shall be inoluded in
the seourity assigned to GermaD7.
In oase, therefore. that the port and town of
Ambriz should be found to lie to the south of the 8th
parallel of south latitude. the line of demaroation
shall start from a point on the coast 5 English miles
south of the port of Ambriz, and be continued thenoe
due east untU it reaches the 16th degree of longitude
east of Greenwioh.
From the interseotion of the line t Which mal
be determined a8 the line of demaroation, with the

16th degxoee of longitude aforesaid, the line shall.
if necessar" be extended along that degree of longitude 80 far south of the 9th parallel of south latitude as will secure to Germany a strip of territorl
not less than a geographical degree in width between
the southern extrem1 ty of the Oongo Free State in the
regiol1 of Lunda and the northern frontier of the
portion of Angola of whioh the oustom. reVenues are
&ssigned to Great Britain.
Done in Duplioate. at London, the 30th day of
August, 1898.
(L.S.)
(L.S'.)

ARTHUR JAMES

P. RATZFELM

BALFOUR

,I

APPENDIX D

Anglo·Portuguese Secret Drclaration
ootober 14, 1699
Secret
The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of
the United Kingdom of Grea.t Britain and Ireland,
Empress Of India, and the Government of His MOst
Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves,
considering 8S of full force and effect the anoient
treatie s of alliance, amity and guarantee which subsist between the two Crowns, specifically oonfirm on
this occasion Article I of the Treaty of the 29th
January, 1642, whi oh runs as follows:
"It is oonoluded and acoorded that there
is, and shall be for ever, a good true and
firm peace and amity between the most renowned
Kings, Charles King of Great Britain and John
the Fourth King of Portugal, their heirs and
suooessors, and their Kingdoms, Countries,
Dominions, Lands, People, Liegemen, Vassals
and SUbjeots whomaoever, present and to come,
of whatsoever oondition, dignity or degree they
may be, 8.S well by land 8.S by sea and fresh
waters, so as the said Vassals and Subjects
are each of them to favour the other and to
use one another with friendly offices and true
affection, and that neither of the said most
renowned Kings, their heirs and suocessors,
by himself or by any other, ahall do or attempt
anything against eaoh other, or their Kingdoms,
by land or by sea, nor shall oonsent nor adhere
unto any war, counsel, or Treaty, in prejudioe
of the other."
They equally oonfirm the final Article of the
Treaty of the 23rd June, 1661, of which the first
part runs as follows:
"Over and above all and Singular agreed and
oonoluded in the ,Treaty of Marriage between the
Mo st ,'serene and Mo at Powerful Charle s, the

--

1. B.D., I, 10. liS.
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Seoond of that name, King of Great Britain .
and the Most Virtuous and Serene Lady
Catherine, Infanta of Portugal, it is by the
Secret Article oonoluded and accorded, that
His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of
the great advantages and increase of dominion
he hath purchased by the above-mentioned
Treaty of Marriage shall promise and oblige
himself, as by this present Artio1e he doth,
to defend and protect all oonquests or ooloni ••
belonging to the Crown of portugal against all
his enemies, as well future a8 present.The Government of Hia Most Faithful Majest7
undertakes not to permit, after the deolaratioXl of war
between Great Britain and the South African Republic,
or during continuance of the war, the importation ancl
passage of arms, and of munitions of war destined for
the latter.
The Government ot His Most Faithful Majesty
will not proclaim neutF$lity in the war between Great
Britain and the South African Republio.
Done in duplicate, at London, this 14th day of
Ootober, 1899.
(L.S.)
(L.a.)

I
f
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SALISBURY
LUIZ DE SOVERAL

APPENDIX K
Enclosure in No. 341
Draft Conventio.l
on Portugue Be Colonie.
Initialled by Grey and Hatzfeldt
October 20, 1913
(Confidential)
In view of the possibili ty that Portugal ID8J
require financial assistance from some foreign Power
or Powers .. &lid bl order to obTiate the international
complioations whioh such a conditio. of things may
produce, and to preserve her integrity and independence, and in view of the special interests of Great
Britain and Germany in their respective possessiOns
and protectorates in East and west Africa oontiguous
to oertain Portuguese dominions, the underSigned, duly
authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have agreed
as follows:
1. (ll Whenever either the British Or the German
Government is of opinion that it is expedient to aooede
to a request for an advance of money to Portugal on the
security of the customs revenues or other revenue. of
Mozambique or Angola, it shall commnnioate the fact to
the other Government, and the other Government she.ll
have the right to advance a part of the total sum
reqUired.
(2) In the event of the other Government 1J1gnifying its intention to exercise this right, the two
Government 6 shall consult as to the terms of these two
lO8ns,2 and these loans shall be issued on the security
of the customs revenues of M.ozambique and Angola as
near! as possible the same proportion to each other as
th. e.mounts of the customs revenues respectively
as signe d al the ir se curi ty.

1. sir Edward Grey to PrInce LiclinowskY. jUly 31,
1913, B.D., X, Pt. lIt No. 341.
2. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913,
has here "the two loans."
.
3. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913,
has he re "nearly."

1M
(3) The loans shall be issued on terms as
favourable to Portugal as the condition of the money
market and the seouri ty of the loans permit, and shall
in other respeots be sub jeot as near1 as- poSSible to
similar oonditions.

2. In the oontingenoy oontemp1ated in the preceding article the custom revenues of that portion of
the provinoe of MOzambique lying south of a line starting from the JOOuth of the River Lultugu., running thence
along that river to its confluence wi th the River
Lugera, thence along that river to its source, thence
along the meridian of that source to the 16th parallel
of south latitude, and thenee along that parallel to
the boundary of the British protectorate of Nyassaland.
as also the oustoms revenues of the portions of the
provinoe of Angola lying to the east of the 20th
meridian of east longitude and south of the Kassai
River, shall be assigned to the British loan; whilst
the oustoms revenues of the remaining parts of the
provinces of Mozambique and Angola (which latter includes the administrative district of the Congo, which
has its seat of government at Cabinda) shall be assigned
to the German loan.
3. In the event of ~reat Britain or Germany sending
delegates to take note of the collection of the
revenues, wh~ch are the security for their respective
loans, the Portuguese Government shall be asked to
give such delegates rights of inspection only, but no
rights of administration, interference, or control, so
long as there is no default in the payment of interest
or sinking fund.
4. In case of default in the payment of the interest
or Sinking fund of either loan, it Shall be agreed with
the Portuguese Government that they will hand over the
administration of the various custom-houses in the two
prQvinces: those assigned for the GerlD8I1 loan to Germany;
those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
I. (1) In the contingenoy contemplated in the
preceding article all rights, whether British or German,
acquired in the provinces affected, before the date of

1. Ibid.
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this convention, shall be fully safeguarded. provided
they are of a purely private character and do not convey either political rights, territorial jurisdiction,
or administrative powers.
(2) It is well understood that no influence
will be used in the future either by the British or
the German Government to obtain fresh oonoessiona,
except in those portions of the provinces of Which the
customs revenues would be assigned to the ir respective
loans under the present convention.
6. From the date of the conclusion of the present
oonvention Great Britain will abstain from advancing
any olaim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, or oontrol of those portions of the Portuguese
provinces in which the oustoms revenues would under the
present convention be assigned to Germany, or of the
islands of San Thome and Prinoipe, or to the exeroi ••
of po1itioal influenoe in those territories or islands;
and Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing
any olaim of whatsoever kind to the possession, oooupation, or control of those portions of the Portuguese
provinces in Which the oustoms revenue s would under
the present oonvention be asstgned to Great Britain,
or of the portuguese part of the island of Timor, or
to the exeroise of political influenoe in those territories or in that island.
,. (l) In the event of either Government obtaining
from the Portuguese Government a cession of terri tory,
or the concession of special privileges not of an
oocasionall oharacter. in those portion. of the
provinces of Mozambique or Angola of which the customs
revenues would be assigned to it, suoh oessions of
territory or oonoessions Qf privileges shall nOi
beoome operative until analogous grants as near as
possible of equal value have been aooorded to the other
Government in those portions of the provinces of whioh
the customs revenues would be assigned to it by the
present convention.
(2) In oase either Government applies for epeoial
privileges of an oooasional l charaoter in those portions

1. The final text inItialled on Ootober 20, 191!,
adds here "that ie, minor or temporary."
2. The final text initialled on Ootober 20, 1913.
has here "nearly."
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of the Portuguese provinces of which the customs
revenues would be assigned to it under the present
convention, it shall immediately inform the other
Goverlmlent and, if these pri Tileges are granted, and
if the other Government Should 80 desire, shall uee
ita influence to obtain for the other Government
similar special privileges of an occasional character
and of equal value.
S. If in any part of the provinces of Mozambique
or Angola the lives or property of BritiSh or German
subjects, or the vital !nterests of the ad30ining
British or German dominions or proteotorates, are endangered by looal disturbances or by the action of
the local authorities, and the Portuguese Government
are not 1a a position to afford the necessary protectiOB, or otherwise fail to do so, the British and
German Governments, after consulting together, and
after a joint communication to the Portuguese Government, ahall determine the nature, duration, and scope
of such measures as it may be deemed necessary to take
for the protection of the interests endangered.

9. If any of the Portuguese colonie. in question,
having beoome independent and having been reoognise'
as such by the two high oontracting parties, or if any
part of such independent colony, should declare its
annexation to the dominions of one of the two contracting Powers, the other contracting Power Shall, for its
part, be entitled, after previously informing the first
Power, to annex those portions of such colony, thna
become independent, of which the oustoms revenues would
be assigned to it under the present couventioB.

.",

10. Great Br itainand Germany, having regard to the
interests of their respective posseBsions in East and
West Africa contiguouB to the Portuguese provinces of
Angola and Mozambique, which would be materially
affected by the intervention of any third Power in
those provinces, agree jointly to oppose suoh intervention whether by way of loan to Portugal on the
security of the revenues of the said provinces, or by
way of acquisition of territory by grant, ceSSion,
purohase, lease or otherwise.

11. In 10 far as Great Britain or Germany may hereafter influence or control the administration ot
MOzambique or Angola or any portion of those province8,
it is understood that the subjeots. $lld·native. of the

1"
protectorates. of one contracting party. together
wit h the ir goode and ships, and also the produoe and
the manufacture s of its dominions, possessions,
colonies. and protectorates, shall, in such portions
of the territories comprise in the present convention
as may fall under the influence or control of the
other contracting party, partioipate in all the prerogatives, exemptions, and privileges with regard to
trade, commerce. taxation, and navigation whioh are
there enjoyed by the subjeots, and natives of the
protectorates, of the other contracting party.
12. The effect of the provisions of the present
convention is shown generally on the annexed copy of
Stanford's Map of Afrioa, 1911.
13. The present oonlention shall replaoe a8 between
the oontraoting Powers the oonvention, secret convention, and seoret note concluded and signed in London
on the 30th August. 1898, which are hereby abrogated.

14. The present oonvention shall be ratified and
the ratifioations thereof shall be exohanged as soon
as possible. The convention shall oome into force
immediatelY after the exohange of ratifioations.
In witness whereof the undersigned, d'Dly
authorised, have Signed the same, and have affixed
thereto their se als.
Done in duplicate at London, the
• 19112

day

0:[

."

1. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913,
omits the words "as between the contra~ting Powers."
2. The agreement was never signed.
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